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In computing taxable income, trusts and estates generally are allowed the
same deductions against gross income as are individuals.' However, an addi-
tional deduction, not available to individuals, is allowed to trusts and estates.
This additional deduction is for distributions of income made by the trust
or estate to beneficiaries.' Thus, although trusts and estates are recognized
for income tax purposes as separate tax-paying entities, and as such are re-
quired to file annual income tax returns and pay an income tax, trusts and
estates are not taxed on income distributed to beneficiaries.' With regard to
such income distributions, trusts and estates operate not as separate tax-paying
entities but as conduits for income to pass through to beneficiaries. The tax
on distributed income, in effect, is shifted to the beneficiaries who receive
the income. Through the use of distributions the fiduciary can allocate the
overall tax due on the trust's or estate's taxable income among the trust or
estate and its beneficiaries. Such use allows for private ordering of the tax
consequences of income realized by the trust or estate. Such private ordering
may in certain cases minimize the overall tax liability on the trust's or estate's
income.
The availability of the income distribution deduction to trusts and estates
with moderate annual income is of particular importance today in light of
* B.A., 1973, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1976, John Marshall Law School; LL.M.
(Taxation), 1978, New York University. Associate Professor of Law, Northern Kentucky University,
Salmon P. Chase College of Law.
1. I.R.C. § 641(b) (1982). The tax on such income is paid by the fiduciary. See also I.R.S.
Form 1041, U.S. Fiduciary Income Tax Return (1987).
2. I.R.C. §§ 651(a) & 661(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
3. In determining the taxable income of the trust or estate, the deduction for income distribu-
tions to beneficiaries is taken on line 17 of Form 1041. See supra note 1. The deduction itself
is computed on Schedule B.-Income Distribution Deduction, page 2 of I.R.S. Form 1041. For
guidance on the preparation of Form 1041, see PRACTCI'NG LAW INSTnTUTr, PREPARATION OF
Tr FmDucIARY INCOME TAX RETURN-1988 (1988).
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the restructuring of the tax rates by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Act). 4 A
stated purpose of the Act was to reduce the tax-saving benefits available when
income is accumulated at the trust or estate level.- To achieve this purpose,
the Act substantially increased the tax rates applicable to trusts and estates
in comparison to those applicable to individuals. This increase was achieved
through two steps. First, the Act reduced the number of tax brackets applicable
to trusts and estates from fourteen to two and, in doing so, significantly flat-
tened the progressivity of the tax rates applicable to trusts and estates. The
new rate structure now provides for an initial tax bracket of 15 percent on
4. For a brief discussion and explanation of the 1986 Act changes to the income tax rate
structure, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., IST SEss., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 12-13, 20-21, 1243-46 (Comm. Print 1987)
[hereinafter GENERAL EXPLANATION].
In addition to altering the rate schedule of trusts and estates, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
also revised the taxation of trusts and estates in a number of other significant ways dealing with
grantor trusts, taxable year of trusts, estimated payments of income tax by trusts and estates,
and generation-skipping trusts. See GENERAL EXPLANATioN, supra, at 1246-51, 1259-68. For a
more detailed discussion of these changes and their planning repercussions, see Smith & Olsen,
Structuring Trusts and Estates after Tax Reform, 1 PRAc. TAX LAW. 29 (1987) and Westfall,
Grantors, Trusts, and Beneficiaries Under the Income Tax Provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, 40 TAX LAw. 713 (1987) [hereinafter Westfall]. These further changes do not
affect the income distribution deduction directly and will not be discussed in this article.
Some commentators have opined that the changes to the taxation of trusts and estates brought
about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are among the most important changes in this area in
the history of the federal income tax. See Westfall, supra at 713; A. McHAEISON & J. BLATIM cHR,
INc mE TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS 1 (12th ed. Supp. 1987).
5. See GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 4, at 1245. The tax savings achieved under prior
law were possible because trusts and estates are taxable entities separate and apart from their
beneficiaries. Consequently, retained income was taxed on the trust's or estate's separate pro-
gressive rate schedule, beginning with the lowest tax bracket; in contrast, had such income been
distributed to a beneficiary, it would have been taxed at the beneficiary's applicable marginal
rates determined by taking into account income from all other sources. The benefit in retaining
or trapping income at the trust or estate level was the double use of the lower brackets in the
progressive rate schedule. This tax-minimizing use of trusts and estates was greatest when the
accumulated or retained income was taxed at the entity's lowest tax rate, but would have been
taxed at the beneficiary's highest marginal rate if distnuted. See Westfall, supra note 4, at
713, 720, 724, & 728. The pre-1986 Act maximum savings in tax liability achieved through ac-
cumulations were $8,450 per year per entity, calculated as follows: The tax liability on taxable
income of $79,500 (the level of income at which a trust or estate reached its 50% maximum
rate under prior law) was $31,300 if accumulated by the trust or estate, or $39,750 if distributed
to a beneficiary already taxed at the 50% marginal rate. The choice to accumulate the income
and tax the $79,500 amount on the separate, progressive schedule of the trust or estate rather
than the flat 50% rate of the beneficiary resulted in the $8,450 savings in tax liability.
For tax-savings calculations through the use of accumulations based on a number of assump-
tions as to amounts of income accumulated, type of income, tax rates, number of trusts, years
of accumulation, and ages of beneficiaries, see J. McGaffey, The Inexact Throwback Rule and
Multiple Trusts, INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 13 (1979). The throwback rule was intended to prevent
this potential for tax avoidance by additionally taxing accumulation distributions. For a general
explanation of the throwback rule, see 3 B. BrrTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND Gwrs 81.5 (1981). See also STA-'F OF TE JOINT COMM. ON INT. REv. TAX'N, 83D CONG.,





the first $5,000 of taxable income, followed by a top bracket of 28 percent
on taxable income over $5,000.6 In comparison to prior law, trusts and estates
now reach their top marginal rate on a smaller amount of accumulated in-
come. 7 Moreover, the 15-percent rate is phased out in the case of taxable
income between $13,000 and $26,000 with the imposition of a 5-percent sur-
charge on income within that range. Thus, trusts and estates with taxable
income over $26,000 do without the benefit of the lower rate and are in effect
subject to a flat tax rate of 28 percent on such income. 8
Second, the Act plays against this change in the rate structure applicable
to trusts and estates a dissimilar change in the tax rates applicable to in-
dividuals. Individuals now enjoy a much wider initial 15-percent tax bracket.
While trusts and estates are subject to this lower rate only on taxable income
under $5,000, individuals enjoy the lower rate on taxable income under $29,750
on joint returns and $17,850 on single returns. 9 Moreover, while the lower
rate for trusts and estates is phased out beginning with taxable income of
$13,000, the threshold amounts for individuals are set much higher: $71,900
on joint returns and $43,150 on single returns. As a result, trusts and estates
reach their surchage phase-out tax rate of 33 percent much sooner than do in-
dividuals."0
The effect of this new rate structure is to reduce the attractiveness of trusts
and estates, but particularly trusts," as devices for minimizing the progressivity
of the tax rates'2 through the accumulation of income. 3 Not only are there
no longer steep progressive rates to be minimized, but more significantly, the
new rate structure with its higher marginal tax rates applicable to trusts and
estates provides a disincentive to accumulate income and an incentive to
distribute trust or estate income over $5,000.
6. I.R.C. § l(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
7. Under prior law, trusts and estates reached their top rate with $79,500 of taxable income.
8. I.R.C. § l(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
9. I.R.C. § 1(a), (c) (Supp. IV 1986).
10. I.R.C. § l(g)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
11. The tax-minimizing use of estates is somewhat limited in that a decedent is required for
each use, an inherent limitation of one per taxpayer. The number of trusts, on the other hand,
is only limited by the multiple trust rule in I.R.C. § 643(f) (Supp. IV 1986). Furthermore, estates
will be recognized as separate taxable entities only during the time required for proper administration
(Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1988)), a period usually much shorter than the period delimited
by the Rule Against Perpetuities during which a valid trust may exist.
12. The progressive rate structure has long spawned legislative responses as well as tax-planning
devices to mitigate against it. See 1 B. BrrrER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES Am
GIFTs 2.2 (1981); W. BLum & H. KALViN, JR., THE UN.sY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
14-19 (1st Phoenix ed. 1963); Blum, An Introduction to the Mathematics of Tax Planning, 57
TAxIIs 707 (1979).
13. The reduction in the attractiveness of the tax shelter effect of the use of trusts and estates
was the desired result of the new rate structure. See GENERA.L ExPLANATioN, supra note 4, at
1245; Westfall, supra note 4, at 713, 720, 724-28. Given the new rates, the tax saved in shifting
from the top marginal rate of 28% to the lowest marginal rate of 15%, available only to the
first $5,000 of taxable income, is $650 ($5,000 x 13 percentage point differential between the
two rates). Compare this to the $8,450 savings in tax liability under prior law. See supra note 5.
1989]
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986, in contrast to prior law, thus makes trust
and estate distributions relatively more attractive than accumulations, thereby
shifting the discussion away from issues dealing with income accumulations
and toward issues dealing with income distributions." This article will ad-
dress the deduction available to trusts and estates for income distributions.
It will discuss how this income distribution deduction is calculated, when it
is available, and which distributions are not eligible for the deduction.
For purposes of this article, it is assumed that a valid and proper trust
or estate exists. Such legal entities create fiduciary relationships by which the
fiduciary holds property and income from that property for distribution to
14. A. MICHAELSON & J. BLATTmAcmt, supra note 4, at 1-2; Westfall, supra note 4, at 713,
720, 730 & 732.
The Committee on Income of Estates and Trusts of the American Bar Association Section
of Taxation is currently considering a legislative initiative to repeal the throwback rule on ac-
cumulations. See agenda for the committee meeting at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the ABA.
In addition to the new rate structure, two other recent legislative changes, one dealing with
estimated tax payments under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the other with multiple trusts under
the Tax Reform Act of 1984, operate to encourage distributions of trust income but in a less
significant way. Before 1986, trusts were not required to make estimated tax payments. As a
result, the tax on accumulated income was imposed on a less current basis than it would have
been had the income been distributed to the trust's beneficiaries. I.R.C. § 6654(l)(I) (Supp. IV
1986) now requires that trusts make installment payments of estimated taxes in the same manner
as individuals. I.R.C. § 643(g) (1982) allows the trustee to elect to treat any portion of an estimated
tax payment as a tax payment made by a beneficiary. This new provision added by the 1986
Act removes any incentive to accumulate income solely to defer installment payments of estimated
taxes.
Likewise, the limitation on the use of multiple trusts in I.R.C. § 643(f) (Supp. IV 1986),
under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, removes the incentive to accumulate income in separate
trusts in order to maximize the use of the resultant separate tax schedules. STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVI-
SIONS OF TE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 255-56 (Comm. Print 1985). Any incentive to
accumulate income in multiple trusts is also negated by the subsequent tax treatment of the distribu-
tions of such accumulations under the throwback rule. Accumulation distributions from more
than two trusts are doubly taxed as a result of I.R.C. § 667(c) (1982), once at the trust level
and again at the beneficiary level. See 3 B. BITTKER, supra note 5, 1 81.5.3.
Not all recent legislative changes, however, have worked to promote distributions rather than
accumulations of income. The requirement in I.R.C. § 645 (Supp. IV 1986), enacted as part
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, that all noncharitable trusts use a calendar-year accounting
period, has removed the incentive previously available to fiscal-year trusts to distribute income
to calendar-year beneficiaries in order to take advantage of deferral of income recognition by
the beneficiaries. See 3 B. BrrrmR, supra, at 81.1.6; Westfall, supra note 4, at 730-31. Distribu-
tions from a calendar-year trust to a fiscal-year beneficiary, although less likely to occur, con-
tinue to offer the deferral benefits and thus encourage distributions. Changes in the rules govern-
ing distributions of property in-kind, enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, also may
work to deflate the incentive to distribute. In-kind distributions no longer are able to carry out
distributable net income in an amount of the fair market value of the property distributed without
the cost of tax recognition to the distributing trust or estate.
The effect of these latter two legislative changes, however, are of marginal impact on the
decision to distribute in that they are not reflected in the decision to distribute ongoing and




beneficiaries under the applicable governing instrument and local law.' 5 Issues
of agency, bailment, and guardian relationships will not be discussed. 6 Neither
will classification issues of trusts or estates."' For purposes of the income
distribution deduction, the applicable provisions do not differentiate between
trusts and estates, with the exception of the 65-day rule and the separate-
trust-share rule.' 8 This uniformity in treatment should be expected, given the
similarities between the fiduciary natures of trusts and estates. Likewise, for
purposes of the income distribution deduction, the distinction between simple
trusts and complex trusts has little significance. 9 The major distinction be-
15. 1 A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2.3 ff. Fratcher 4th ed., 1987); Commissioner v.
Beebe, 67 F.2d 662 (Ist Cir. 1933) (estate); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.641(a)-2, 1.641(b)-3(a), and
§ 301.7701-4(a), -6 (1988).
16. For a discussion on the taxation of such relationships, see 3 B. BrrrKER, supra note
5, at 82.4. Generally speaking, transactions and income are reported by the principals and
wards directly on their own individual returns, not on fiduciary returns. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-7,
1.641(b)-3(d) (1988). See also Commissioner v. Bollinger, 108 S. Ct. 1173 (1988) (nominee cor-
poration treated as agent and not taxed). Because the income is taxed directly to the principal
and ward, the mechanism of an income distribution deduction is not needed to allocate the tax
between the agent and principal.
17. On the classification issues of trusts, see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), 2(a)(2), -4 (1988).
On the issue of trusts reclassified as corporations, see Bedell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1207
(1986); Sliskovich & Karlinsky, Tax Classification of Trusts: The Howard Case and Other Cur-
rent Developments, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 803 (1986); Note, Determining the Taxable Status of
Trusts That Run Businesses, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 1142 (1985).
If the period of administration of an estate is unduly prolonged, the estate is considered
terminated for income tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.641(b)-3(a) (1988). See also 3 B. BrrrKER,
supra note 5, at 81.8.2. In such an event, the income of the estate subsequent to the termina-
tion is considered the income of the person succeeding to the property of the estate. Treas. Reg.
§ 641(b)-3(d) (1988). Because the income is taxed directly to the beneficiary, resort to an income
distribution deduction as an allocative mechanism is not needed.
18. The 65-day rule and the separate-trust-share rule are discussed later in the article. An
estate is a fiduciary relationship created under local law upon the death of the decedent pursuant
to which the estate holds property for distribution to beneficiaries under the direction of a pro-
bate court. Commissioner v. Beebe, 67 F.2d 662 (Ist Cir. 1933). For income tax purposes, in-
come from property held by the estate and realized during the administration of the estate is
subject to taxation. I.R.C. § 641(a)(3) (1982); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.641(a)-i, -2(d); 1.641(b)-2, -3(a)
(1988). Such income is generally taxed in the same manner as the income realized by complex
trusts. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-i (1988). The simple trust model was not chosen because it is usually
not applicable; unlike simple trusts, estates are rarely required to distribute income currently.
On the distinction between simple and complex trusts, see infra note 19.
A bankruptcy estate of an individual is not subject to these rules and is not allowed a deduc-
tion for distributions to creditors or the bankrupt. I.R.C. §§ 1398 & 6012(a)(9) (Supp. IV 1986)
& 6012(b)(4) (1982) added by the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 589, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess., § 3(a), (b) (1980). As to prior law, see Williams v. United States, 667 F.2d 1108 (4th
Cir. 1981) and Rev. Rul. 78-134, 1978-1 C.B. 197.
19. The terms "simple trust" and "complex trust" are not used in the Tax Code. The terms,
however, are used in the regulations and are a part of the tax jargon in this area of the tax
laws. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.651(a)-1, 1.661(a)-i (1988).
A simple trust is generally a trust that distributes current income only. Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-I
(1988). A complex trust is defined negatively as any nongrantor trust that is not a simple trust.
Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-i (1988). Thus a complex trust is a trust that under its governing instru-
1989]
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tween these two types of trusts for tax purposes lies in the two-tier structure
applicable to complex trusts. This tier system, however, functions only to
allocate the tax on distributed trust income between different types of
beneficiaries. It has no effect on the calculation of the income distribution
deduction at the trust level. That deduction is calculated without reference
to the type of beneficiary receiving the deduction.20
I. Basic Concept: A Hybrid Taxable Entity
As a general principle, trust or estate income that is or must be distributed
to beneficiaries when realized by the trust or estate is taxed to the
beneficiaries. 2' Income that is neither distributed nor required to be distributed
is taxed to the trust or estate on its own tax return using its separate tax-rate
structure.2 This basic concept is implemented by allowing the trust or estate,
in computing its taxable income, a deduction for income distributions that
are made or that should have been made to beneficiaries.2 3 As a result, trust
ment: (1) accumulates trust income pursuant to a direction or discretion; (2) actually distributes
corpus, i.e., amounts other than trust income; or (3) pays, permanently sets aside, or uses amounts
for charitable purposes. All trusts in the year of termination are complex trusts, since by necessity
such trusts distribute corpus. Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-3 (1988). Trust income here refers to trust
or fiduciary accounting income and not taxable income or distributable net income. I.R.C. §
643(b) (1982) and4Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-i (1988). Whether a trust is a simple or complex trust
is determined annually. Thus a trust may float in and out of the two designations and be classified
as a simple trust in one year and a complex trust for another year. Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-1
and -2(c) (1988).
One difference between simple and complex trusts, however, matters for purposes of deter-
mining the income distribution deduction. Only simple trusts in calculating their distributable
net income (DNI) exclude extraordinary dividends and taxable stock dividends allocable to corpus.
I.R.C. § 643(a)(4) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-4 (1988). This is a material distinction since
the amount of a trust's DNI sets a limitation on the maximum amount deductible by the trust,
whether simple or complex, with respect to distributions to beneficiaries. Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-O
(1988).
20. See 3 B. Bn-ixER, supra note 5, at 81.4.4; M. FERGUsoN, J. FREELAND & R. STEPHENs,
FEDERAL INCOmE TA XATON OF EsTATES AN BEN rsciARias 386-93, 393-466 (1970) [hereinafter
M. FERGUSON].
21. I.R.C. §§ 652, 662 (1982).
22. I.R.C. §§ l(e) (Supp. IV 1986) and 641 (1982); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.641(a)-i, -2 & 1.641(b)-i,
-2 (1988).
23. I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (1982). The use of trusts and estates as mere accounting entities rather
than separate taxpaying entities dates back to the beginning of the modem income tax. For historical
background, see L. KENNY, FEDERAL INcomaE TAXATION OF TRUSTS AND ESTATES (1948); Holland,
Kennedy, Surrey & Warren, A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Trusts
and Estates-American Law Institute Draft, 53 CoLum. L. RaV. 316 (1953); Kamin, Surrey &
Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1237 (1954).
The 1913 Income Tax Act treated fiduciaries essentially as withholding agents. Tariff Act
of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, 63d Cong., 1st Sess., § II, D (1913). The Revenue Act of 1916
taxed the fiduciary as a separate entity on income accumulated by the fiduciary for unborn or
unascertained beneficiaries. Pub. L. No. 271, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 2(b), 13(c) (1916). See
also First Trust & Say. Bank v. Smietanka, 257 U.S. 602 (1922). The Revenue Act of 1924 clarified
the taxation of undistributed amounts in discretionary trusts and in doing so implemented the
conduit theory of the taxation of trusts and estates. Pub. L. No. 176, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.,
[Vol. 42:1
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or estate income is taxed only once as such income makes its way to the
beneficiaries. Under this single tax scheme, whatever income is distributed
is taxed only to the beneficiaries and whatever income is not distributed is
taxed only to the trust or estate.2" This basic concept carries out the conduit
mechanism of the income taxation of trusts and estates.
2 5
To illustrate this concept, assume that a trust (or estate) has gross income
from rental property of $13,000 and rental expenses of $3,000. Under the
terms of the trust instrument (or the will), the trustee (or executor) distributes
$4,000 each to beneficiaries B and C. The trust (or estate) is taxed on $2,000
of income ($10,000 net income less $8,000 total distributions). The beneficiaries
are each taxed on their respective $4,000 distributions. The income distribution
deduction thus allocates the single tax on the net taxable income of $10,000
between the fiduciary entity and its beneficiaries. This single tax scheme is
in contrast to the double taxation of corporate earnings and profits. To the
extent trust or estate income is distributed, the taxing scheme described above
resembles the conduit approach of partnership taxation.
2 6 To the extent the
trust or estate income is retained and not distributed, the taxing scheme im-
posed and described above resembles corporate taxation with its entity level
tax, but without its double tax effect.17 Trusts and estates thus are hybrid
§ 219(b)(2) (1924). This fundamental design is still the law today. The process of determining
the amount of the deduction available has occasionally changed through the years, most recently
under the Tax Reform Act of 1984, but the fundamental theory has remained the same. The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not enact any changes in this basic policy. For all its ferment in
this area, the 1986 Act left unchanged the definition of distributable net income and the mechanism
of the income distnution deduction as a means of allocating the tax liability on trust or estate
income between the entity and its beneficiaries. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 4, at 1245
(marginal tax rates increased to curb unjustified use of trusts and estates while still retaining
existing structure-separate table unit, DNI, income distribution deduction-of taxing such entities).
24. When income previously taxed to a trust or estate is later distributed to beneficiaries,
such distributions of accumulated income do not result in an income distribution deduction to
the trust or estate. However, to preserve the single tax concept of the income taxation of trusts
and estates, these subsequent distributions are not taxed to the beneficiaries. If the throwback
rule is triggered and the beneficiary pays additional taxes on the distribution of the accumulated
income, such income is not reported and taxed again, but rather not enough tax was initially
withheld from the trust when such income was accumulated and taxed to the trust. Again, for
a general explanation of the throwback rule, see 3 B. BrTTKER, supra note 5, at 81.5. For
historical development of the rule, see Acker, The Throwback Rule: Its Historical Development
and How It Works, 10 REv. TAX'N IND ImUALs 107 (1986).
25. There are a number of standard works and treatises on the taxation of income of estates
and trusts and their beneficiaries. See A.L.I., FEDERAL INcomE TAx PROJEcT-SUBcHAPTER J
(1985); 3 B. Brrr=, supra note 5, chs. 80-83; M. FERGUSON, supra note 20; A. McHtsoN
& J. BLAr-rcan, INcoME TAXATION oF ESTATES AND TRUSTS (12th ed. 1985); J. PmnL, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE INcomE TAxAnoIN oF TRUSTS, ESTATES, GRANTORS AN BENFaCLAIES
(1987); J. PEsc L & E. SPURGEON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS, GRANTORS AND BENEFICiIFS
(1978); P.L.I., INcoME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRusTs 1986 (Course Handbook Series, 1986).
26. I.R.C. § 701 (1982); United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 n.8 (1973). See also 3
B. BrranR, supra note 5, at 85.1.1.
27. I.R.C. §§ 11, 301 (1982). The double taxation of trust income is possible in the case
of distributions of accumulated income by multiple trusts subject to the throwback rule. I.R.C.
§§ 667(c), 667(b)(1) (1982). See 3 B. BrrrKER, supra note 5, at 81.5.3.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
taxable entities resembling parts from each of these two opposing models of
taxable units.
Beause this scheme for the taxation of fiduciary income applies only to
nongrantor trusts and estates, the income distribution deduction is not available
to grantor trusts.2 8 Grantor trusts thus will not be discussed in this article.
This does not mean, however, that the income of grantor trusts is taxed twice,
once at the trust level (bereft of the distribution deduction) and again at the
beneficiary level. The single tax scheme is again carried out without the need
to resort to the income distribution deduction because whether or not the
income is distributed, such income is taxed to the grantors.29 Grantor trusts
are thus pure conduits, whereas nongrantor trusts are a hybrid tax entity,
switching from conduit to entity taxation with the availability of the income
distribution deduction.
The basic concept described above does not apply to all trust and estate
distributions and, hence, not all fiduciary distributions result in a deduction.
Distributions of corpus and of specific gifts or bequests are not eligible for
the income distribution deduction. Also, distributions to nonbeneficiaries and
distributions to beneficiaries outside their role as beneficiaries fall outside this
scheme of taxation, as discussed below.
II. Definition of Distribution
Trust or estate distributions eligible for the income distribution deduction
are distributions made to beneficiaries in their capacity as beneficiaries.
Distributions to nonbeneficiaries and distributions to beneficiaries not in their
capacity as beneficiaries are not eligible for the income distribution deduc-
tion. Moreover, even if made to beneficiaries as such, certain distributions,
such as distributions of specific gifts or bequests, charitable donations, and
distributions of items of income in respect of a decedent (IRD), do not qualify
for the deduction.
The tax provisions providing for the income distribution deduction do not
define "distributions" that qualify for the deduction." However, the mirror
provisions to these sections3 provide, in carrying out the distribution scheme,
that as a prerequisite to the deduction the distributions must be included in
the income of the recipient who receives such amounts as a beneficiary. Accord-
ingly, trust or estate distributions eligible for the deduction are distributions
made to persons in their capacity as beneficiaries. Distributions to persons
who have no interest in the fiduciary relationship are not distributions for
purposes of the deduction-inclusion rules. Therefore, distributions that are
mere disbursements by the fiduciary in payment for services or property are
not distributions qualifying for the income distribution deduction. Thus, the
payment of fiduciary fees, funeral expenses and interest, payment for tax
and investment-advice and services, the repayment of loans, and the purchase
28. I.R.C. § 671 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.641(a)-0(b) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.671-1(d) (1988).
29. I.R.C. § 671 (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.671-3, -4 (1988).
30. I.R.C. §§ 651(a) and 661(a) (1982) only speak of distributions of income or of any other
amounts.




of property are not distributions for purposes of the income distribution deduc-
tion. Their deductibility, if any, to the trust or estate is determined under
other provisions of the tax laws. 32 To do otherwise might result in a double
deduction for such disbursements.
A beneficiary to whom deductible distributions are made is defined to include
heirs, legatees, and devisees.3 3 Identifying the recipients of deductible distribu-
tions and determining the amount of such distributions is done with reference
to the governing instrument expressing the intent of the settlor or decedent
and with reference to applicable local law. Moreover, only proper payments
qualify as distributions. Improper payments made to beneficiaries under
mistake of law or fact are not eligible for the income distribution deduction.
34
Distributions eligible for the deduction are not limited to beneficiaries named
in the governing instrument. A person whose legal obligation is discharged
or satisfied with amounts distributed by the trust or estate is a beneficiary.
The amount so used is considered distributed to the person whose legal obliga-
tion is discharged and the distribution is eligible for the income distribution
deduction.3 Also, distributions need not be actually made to be-considered
"distributions." The following two constructive distributions are eligible for
the income distribution deduction: distributions required by the will or trust
instrument but not made, 36 and distributions relating back to a previous year
under the 65-day rule discussed later in this article.
32. I.R.C. § 641(b) (1982). See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163, 212, 642(g) (1982).
33. I.R.C. § 643(c) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.643(c)-I (1988). An honorary trust for a pet animal
is not permitted an income distribution deduction. The trust lacks a beneficiary who is a taxable
person to whom the tax liability on the trust income can be shifted via the income distribution.
Rev. Rul. 76-486, 1976-2 C.B. 192.
34. Bohan v. United States, 456 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1972), aff'g, 326 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D.
Mo. 1971) and Rev. Rule 71-335, 1971-2 C.B. 250 (whether amounts are properly paid depends
on the terms of the governing instrument and local law). The Internal Revenue Service takes
the position that amounts are properly paid even if subject to repayment to meet obligations
of the estate. Rev. Rul. 72-396, 1972-2 C.B. 312. But see Estate of Johnson v. Commissioner
88 T.C. 225 (1987) (Informal work paper entries of income distributions never actually made,
but retained by executor to meet anticipated contingent liabilities during settlement of estate
are not properly paid and do not support an income distribution deduction). See also Wheeling
Dallas Say. & Loan v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. W. Va. 1981); American Nat'l
Bank & Tr. Co. v. United States, 46 A.F.T.R.2d 6007 (6th Cir. 1980) (distributions made under
a poorly drafted trust instrument were improper and not deductible). But see Lemle v. United
States, 419 F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (payments applied to spouse's elective share were properly
paid).
35. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.643(c)-l(a), 1.661(a)-2(d), 1.662(a)-4 (1988). Thus, if pursuant to the
terms of the will or trust instrument, the fiduciary pays off a debt owed by the grantor's or
decedent's child, the payment is deemed a distribution to the child. However, if the legal obliga-
tion discharged is that of the grantor or the grantor's spouse, the grantor trust rules override
the application of the distribution rules. See supra text at note 28. But see I.R.C. §§ 677(b)
and 678(c) (1982), applying the complex trust distribution rules to amounts paid by a
trust out of corpus or out of sources other than income for the taxable year. Treas. Reg. §
1.661(a)-2(c) (1988). The term "legal obligation" includes a legal obligation to support another
person if, and only if, the obligation is not affected by the adequacy of the dependent's own
resources. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.661(a)-2(d), 1.662(a)-4 (1988).
36. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.661(a)-2(b), 1.651(a)-i, -2 (1988) and Rev. Rul. 62-147, 1962-2 C.B.
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Again, the identity of the beneficiary receiving the actual or constructive
distribution is immaterial for calculating the income distribution deduction
and is only legally significant in the application of the two-tier system." The
identity of the recipient-beneficiary only resolves the question of who among
the beneficiaries is ultimately taxed on the amounts distributed. The trust or
estate, in any event, will not be taxed on such distributed amounts.
Finally, an assumption that a distribution made to a beneficiary as such
is automatically a distribution eligible for the deduction is erroneous. The
following are nondeductible distributions to beneficiaries discussed later in
this article: (1) distributions of a specific sum of money or property; (2)
distributions of property passing directly to beneficiaries; (3) distributions to
charitable donees; (4) distributions deducted in prior years; and (5) distribu-
tions of a right to receive income in respect of a decedent.
Distributions in Payment of Grantor's or Decedent's Debts
As discussed above, only distributions to beneficiaries as such are eligible
for the income distribution deduction. Disbursements to creditors are not eligi-
ble.3 8 In this regard, however, although a legacy or a family support allowance
may be characterized as a debt under local law, for tax purposes such
disbursements are treated as distributions made to a beneficiary as such.3
Alimony payments are similarly treated as distributions to a beneficiary even
though made in discharge of the payor's debt obligation. Family support
allowances and alimony payments are discussed below.
This treatment of disbursements in payment of the grantor's or decedent's
debts is consistent with the purposes of the income distribution deduction.
The deduction, as noted, allocates the tax on the income of a trust or estate
between the fiduciary and the beneficiary, thereby ensuring that such income
is taxed only once. Income distributed by the fiduciary outside the beneficiary
relationship should be taxed under the general tax rules just as any other trans-
action between two unrelated and separately taxed entities dealing at arm's-
length would be taxed. As a result, such amounts may in some cases be taxed
twice, to the recipient and also to the fiduciary if not deductible by the fiduciary
when paid. For example, the decedent's final medical expenses paid by the
estate are not deductible by the estate.40 Funeral expenses paid by the estate
are likewise not deductible.4' Payments by the estate of these and other similar
does not vitiate income distribution deduction; presence of a distribution depends on terms of
governing instrument, not on any action taken by trustee).
37. See supra note 20.
38. Thomas Lonergan Tr. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 715 (1946) (payments made by a testamen-
tary trust were in discharge of decedent's obligations incurred prior to his death as part of a
property purchase). See also Alfred 1. DuPont Testamentary Tr. v. Commissioner, 574 F.2d
1332 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'g 66 T.C. 761 (1976) (payments not for the benefit of beneficiary as
such but rather made by virtue of recipient's rights under a lease).
39. Rev. Rul. 75-124, 1975-1 C.B. 183.
40. I.R.C. § 213(c)(1) (1982). Such expenses may be deducted on the decedent's last tax return
if paid within one year of decedent's death. Of course, such expenses are deductible for estate
tax purposes. I.R.C. §§ 213(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) and 2053(a)(3) (1982).




death costs remain nondeductible even if made to a residuary legatee and are
applied against the legatee's share of the residuary estate.' 2 Similarly, the pay-
ment of fiduciary fees may not be fully deductible in some cases by the trust
or estate.' 3 However, a deduction may be afforded the trust or estate under
a different provision of the tax laws. Thus, expenses, interest, and taxes owed
by the decedent and attributable to the period prior to the decedent's death
are deductible by the estate when paid by the estate but only as deductions
in respect of the decedent."
Where the recipient of the fiduciary distribution is also a beneficiary, the
resolution is not as straightforward. If a beneficiary has a dual relationship
with the trust or estate, such as a creditor-beneficiary relationship arising out
of a separate and independent contractual arrangement, distributions are not
eligible for the income distribution deduction if made to the beneficiary in
any capacity other than that of a beneficiary. Similarly, if a beneficiary is
compensated for services rendered to the trust or estate, such distributions
may be deductible under the general provisions of the tax laws but are not
deductible distributions under the distribution rules."
The issue raised in such instances involves the characterization of the recip-
ient receiving the disbursements made by the trust or estate. The resolution
of this issue depends on the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the pay-
ment. If the facts reveal that the distribution is to compensate the recipient
for services rendered to the decedent prior to his death, the income distribu-
tion deduction is not available."' Moreover, that the creditor successfully en-
forces this claim against the estate is immaterial" The result is similar for
distributions made pursuant to settlement of a claim against the estate based
on services rendered to the decedent.' 8
42. Harkness v. United States, 469 F.2d 310 (Cl. Ct. 1972).
43. I.R.C. § 212 is now subject to the limitation in I.R.C. § 67(a) & (e) (Supp. IV 1986),
which imposes a 2%70 floor on certain itemized deductions.
44. I.R.C. § 691(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
45. Although in most cases, the amounts paid out will be deductible in any event under other
tax provisions, this distinction in the status of the recipient is becoming more important as Con-
gress is increasingly curtailing the availability of general deductions. These new limitations on deduc-
tions cannot be overcome by characterizing the disbursement as a "distribution" eligible for
the as yet unlimited income distribution deduction.
46. WVolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1974); Braddock v. United States, 434
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970); Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959); Wallace v.
Commissioner, 219 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1955).
A distribution to a beneficiary in appreciation of his long and devoted service to the decedent
in his declining years, without more, is eligible for the income distribution deduction. The be-
quest appears to proceed out of affection and is made to an heir in fact. Commissioner v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) (defining a gift in the statutory sense as a transfer that proceeds
out of affection, respect, admiration, charity, or like impulses). But compare Rev. Rul. 57-398,
1957-2 C.B. 93.
47. Rev. Rul. 67-375, 1967-2 C.B. 60.
48. Early v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1971); Davis v. United States, 56 A.F.T.R.2d
5691 (D. Mont. 1985); Cohen v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Mariana
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 135 (1970); Zaharoolis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1976-76; Hansen
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1974-12.
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Resolving the beneficiary-creditor conundrum is more difficult when an heir
in fact is also appointed an executor of the decedent's estate. Where the dece-
dent appoints one of his children as executor of his estate for which services
the child is paid a sum certain under the terms of the will, the amount so
distributed is not a deductible distribution.49 The resolution is less certain,
however, where the decedent appoints his child as executor of his estate and
bequeaths a sum certain to the child in lieu of all compensation for services
rendered as an executor. The amount distributed is most likely not a deducti-
ble distribution. In 1923, the United States Supreme Court held in United States
v. Merriam that because the beneficiary received such an amount as an inheri-
tance, it would for our purpose become a deductible distribution. 0 However,
given the subsequent case law, the continued vitality of the Merriam decision is
in doubt." In reaching its decision, the Court found controlling the fact that
the services rendered as an executor were not required as a condition for the
payment.2 Hence, the amounts received were not income derived from labor,
which at that time was a necessary element within the definition of income.1
That narrow definition of income has since been repudiated by the Supreme
Court. Today, the Court includes nondonative windfalls, even if received
without the exchange of services, in its definition of income. 4
Congress attempted to resolve part of the creditor-beneficiary conundrum
when it provided, as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, that as a matter
of law, payments to an employee can never be classified as gifts or bequests."
Although this new provision was intended to put an end to the extensive litiga-
tion based on the employee-donee dichotomy," the remaining issue is what
constitutes an employer-employee relationship. Whether the definition is broad
enough to include an independent contractor, an agency relationship, and an
executor relationship is unclear. Furthermore, it is also unclear whether the
provision applies only to life-time transfers or whether it should also include
testamentary transfers. The new provision, however, does indicate a continuing
congressional distrust of gifts or bequests with a service overtone.
The unavailability of the income distribution deduction in the creditor con-
text need not necessarily be mourned by the fiduciary. Quite the contrary,
in some cases structuring the distributions in such a way that they are treated
49. On the possibility of taking an estate tax deduction for such an expense, see I.R.C. §§
642(g) and 2053(a)(2) (1982). On the income tax consequences of a waiver of the fees, see Rev.
Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 C.B. 20.
50. 263 U.S. 179 (1923).
51. See, e.g., WVolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608, 611 (2d Cir. 1974) (Merriam was inap-
plicable because there was no question that the services were actually rendered).
52. United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 185 (1923).
53. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
54. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
-55. I.R.C. § 102(c) (Supp. IV 1986), added by § 122(b) of the Act, Pub. L. No. 514, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
56. For two recent cases, see Abdella v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1983-616 and Runyon





as payments to a creditor, such as a payment of executor's fees, may be helpful.
The advantage lies in the fact that such expenses are deductible on the estate
tax return 7 against tax rates much higher than the income tax rates.5 1 In addi-
tion, this characterization of the expenses preserves the estate's distributable
net income for application to other deductible distributions to beneficiaries
without wasting a deduction for the administrative expenses paid. 9
Family Support Payments
A widow's allowance 6 and a family support allowance6' paid by an estate
are deductible by the estate. Amounts paid or required to be paid by an estate
pursuant to a court order or decree, or under local law as an allowance or
award for the support of the decedent's widow or other dependent for a limited
period during the administration of the estate, are distributions eligible for
the income distribution deduction.62 The deduction is available whether the
allowance is payable from income or corpus.63 Support allowances paid by
57. I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2) (1982). If taken against the estate tax, such expenses may not again
be deducted against the income of the estate. I.R.C. § 642(g) (1982).
58. Compare I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1) (1982) and (2) (Supp. IV 1986) with rates ranging from
37'7 0-55% in the case of decedents dying before 1993 (after taking the unified credit into ac-
count) with I.R.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1986) with rates of 15% and 28%. Moreover, in the case
of taxable estates of more than $21,040,000 ($18,340,000 in the case of decedents dying after
1992), the graduated estate tax rates are phased out and the estate tax is imposed at a flat 50%
rate. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(3) (1982).
The choice in treatment is between deducting the payment as an administrative expense on
the estate tax return or treating the payment as a bequest of a specific sum of money. In the
former choice, the estate tax savings from the estate tax deduction under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2)
(1982) is compared with the income tax cost from the income inclusion to the executor under
I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). In the latter choice, the foregone benefit of the estate tax
deduction is compared to the negated income tax cost to the beneficiary who receives a tax-free
inheritance under I.R.C. § 663(a) (Supp. IV 1986). In neither case is the estate entitled, however,
to an income tax deduction. In the former choice, the estate is not entitled to an income tax
deduction because of I.R.C. § 642(g) (1982), supra note 57; in the latter choice, because of I.R.C.
§ 663(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
59. Whether the payment is characterized as a payment of an estate debt or a distribution
of a specific bequest, the estate is not entitled to an income distribution deduction for the payment.
As a corollary because the payment is not an income deductible distribution, either because it
is not a "distribution" to a beneficiary or because it is nondeductible under I.R.C. § 663(a)
(1982), it also does not drain the estate's distributable net income.
Moreover, although the payment of the executor's fees represents an economic outlay, it
does not reduce DNI by an equal amount. This is because the starting point for the calculation
of DNI is taxable income. I.R.C. § 643(a) (Supp. IV 1986). Payments allowed as a deduction
in computing the taxable estate are disallowed as a deduction in computing taxable income, I.R.C.
§ 642(g) (1982). Likewise, payments of specific bequests to beneficiaries are not deductible in
computing the estate's taxable income, I.R.C. § 663(a) (Supp. IV 1986), referring to § 661(a) (1982).
60. Estate of McCoy v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 562 (1968) (invalidating a prior rule in the
regulations).
61. Cameron v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 744 (1977).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(e) (1988), issued as T.D. 7287 (Sept. 26, 1973) and adopting
the decision in Estate of McCoy v. Commisioner, 50 T.C. 562 (1968). The retroactive application
of the regulation was upheld in Schaefer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1983-465.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(e) (1988).
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a trust, however, are not subject to this rule. They are instead governed by
the grantor trust rules.6
4
Alimony and Child Support Payments
A trust is a useful device for securing legal obligations arising out of a
divorce. 6' A trust can be specifically created, or utilized if already in existence
at the time of divorce or legal separation, for purposes of making alimony
payments, providing for child support, or dividing marital property. Such trusts
are referred to in tax parlance as "alimony trusts." It is a term, however,
that is not used in the Internal Revenue Code and hence lacks a statutory
or technical meaning.
66
An alimony trust is a trust required by a divorce or separation instrument
under the terms of which the payor-spouse transfers a specified amount of
money or property to the trust and the income of which is to be paid to the
payee-spouse for the payee's life or until the payee remarries, the remainder
over to payor or others.67 Likewise, a support trust created incident to a
prenuptial agreement may be used to discharge support obligations imposed
by a subsequent divorce.68 Moreover, a payee-spouse may also be the assignee
of a beneficial interest in a preexisting trust created for the benefit of the
payor .6 For example, the payor in discharge of his support obligation under
a divorce assigns a part or all of his income interest in a trust previously
created for him by another.
The tax consequences of these various alimony trust payments are governed
by section 682. That provision provides rules for determining the taxability
of a trust's income as between the trust and the spouses who are now divorced
or legally separated. Under these rules, the spouse actually entitled to receive
income payments from the trust is considered the beneficiary of the trust. 70
The presence of a beneficiary to whom trust distributions are made then triggers
the application of the normal deduction-inclusion rules for the taxation of
trusts."' The distributed income of the alimony trust is taxed to the payee-
spouse as a beneficiary of the trust. The trust is then allowed a deduction
for the distribution. The same treatment applies to the estate of the payor
which continues to make support payments to a surviving payee. 72
Section 682 thus designates whether the payor or the payee-spouse is the
taxed beneficiary of the trust income. The provision allocates the tax on the
64. I.R.C. § 677(a) (Supp. IV 1986), (b) (1982).
65. Trusts can also be used to avoid marital claims. See Westfall, supra note 4, at 732, point-
ing out the usefulness of trusts in avoiding equitable distribution of property upon divorce.
66. Curiously enough, I.R.C. § 215(d) (Supp. IV 1986) refers to the term "alimony trust"
in a cross-reference to I.R.C. § 682 (Supp. IV 1986).
67. See example in Treas. Reg. § 1.682(b)-1(b) (1988).
68. See examples (1) and (2) in Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-1(a)(4) (1988).
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.682(a)-1(a)(3) (1988).
70. I.R.C. § 682(b) (Supp. IV 1986); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.682(a)-1(a)(l), 1.682(b)-l(a) (1988).
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.682(b)-l(a) (1988).




income in much the same way that sections 71 and 215 allocate the tax on
alimony payments made directly and without the use of trusts.73 In doing
so, section 682 treats an alimony trust as a mere accounting and accom-
modating device that is not taxed on the income it distributes.
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1984, the tax treatment of alimony trusts
was, in certain cases, governed by former section 71(d), depending upon
whether the trust predated the divorce.74 The uncertainty in the overlap be-
tween the two provisions was resolved by the 1984 Act with the repeal of section
71(d).1 5 With respect to trust transfers made after July 18, 1984, section 682
applies exclusively to alimony trusts. Despite the uncertainty and difficulty
under prior law in deciding which section applied to alimony payments, the
availability of the income distribution deduction was not affected. While the
1984 amendment applies section 682 exclusively to alimony trusts, the amend-
ment did not change the application of the income distribution deduction.
The difference between the prior and amended provision is in the treatment
of the beneficiary, an irrelevant factor for purposes of the income distribu-
tion deduction.
By its own terms, section 682(a) does not apply to payments for support
of minor children. Specifically, section 682(a) provides that it shall not apply
to that part of any trust income which the terms of the decree, written separa-
tion agreement, or trust instrument fix in terms of an amount of money that
is payable for the support of minor children of the payor-spouse."6 As a result,
the payee-spouse is not treated as the beneficiary of the trust income so
distributed because section 682(b) treats the payee as the beneficiary only if
section 682(a) applies. Therefore, the payor-spouse whose legal obligation is
discharged by the payments becomes the beneficiary under either the grantor
or nongrantor trust rules." If the payments are not adequately earmarked
or "fixed"" 7 or if paid for the support of children of majority age, the
payments will be treated as payments to which the payee-spouse is entitled
as a beneficiary under section 682(a).
73. Alimony payments received by a payee as a beneficiary, however, benefit from the
qualitative flow-through of the taxation of trusts and estates, discussed infra part III. Payee-
spouses thus may, in some cases, prefer payments from an alimony trust rather than direct alimony
payments. This choice is independent of the availability of the income distribution deduction.
74. J. PESCHEL & E. SPJRGEoN, supra note 25, at 8.05.
75. Pub. L. No. 369, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., § 422(a) (1984). See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1492 (1984).
76. I.R.C. § 682(a) (1982) (second sentence).
77. I.R.C. § 677(b) (1982); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.661(a)-2(d) and 1.662(a)-4 (1988), which apply
in instances when the legal obligation discharged is not governed by I.R.C. § 682 (1982). See
also Rev. Rul. 74-94, 1974-1 C.B. 26.
78. There is a question whether the term "fixed" should be read in the broader, anti-Lester
sense of I.R.C. § 71(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). For purposes of the income distribution deduction,
the issue is not material, however. Whether or not the payments are sufficiently fixed, the alimony
trust will not be taxed on the income it distributes. If the payments are sufficiently fixed, the
trust will be allowed a deduction for making income distributions to the payee-spouse. If the
payments are not sufficiently fixed, the trust will either be ignored under the grantor trust rules
or it will be allowed a deduction for making constructive income distributions to the payor-spouse.
19891
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1989
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
This treatment accorded child support payments made pursuant to a trust
is consistent with the treatment accorded direct child support payments under
section 71(c): the payee is not taxed; rather the payor is taxed in that he is
denied a section 215 deduction." 9 Because the payor-spouse is taxed on such
income, the trust (or estate) should not be taxed with regard to such income."
Section 682 designates which person will be treated as the beneficiary of
an alimony trust. The tension in the provision is over who the beneficiary
is, not over whether there is a beneficiary. In all events, assuming the distribu-
tions are properly made under the governing instrument, such distributions
will be eligible for the income distribution deduction.
Finally, section 682 by its own terms applies only to distributions of trust
"income" which the payee-spouse is entitled to receive. Although the term
"income" is not defined in the section,' it should not be extended to include
distributions made to carry out a settlement of marital property rights. Whether
a preexisting trust is used, or a trust is specifically created for this purpose,
the transfer of the property by the trust is in discharge of the transferor-
spouse's legal obligation to transfer a share of the marital property. In such
cases, the transferor is the beneficiary of the trust,"z leaving the trust again
untaxed. This reading of section 682 is consistent with the nonrecognition
treatment accorded spouses on property transfers incident to a divorce under
section 1041.
III. The Income Distribution Deduction
The income distribution deduction initially equals the amount of income
and property distributed by the trust or estate to the beneficiaries. The amount
of the deduction so determined, however, is limited to the trust's or estate's
distributable net income (DNI). As a result, any distributions in excess of
the trust's or estate's DNI are not deductible. In the case of distributions
of property in kind, special rules discussed below apply to determine the
amount of the distributions as well as the effect of the distributions on DNI.
An exception to this statutory scheme is property or money transfers
specifically donated or bequeathed. Such transfers fall outside the deduction-
inclusion scheme which includes the income distribution deduction and are
discussed later in this article.
Amount of Deduction Limited to Amount of Distribution
In any given year, a trust or estate may make mandatory as well as discre-
tionary distributions to its beneficiaries. The beneficiaries who receive these
79. I.R.C. § 215 (Supp. IV 1986) is triggered only if the payee-spouse recognizes alimony
income under I.R.C. § 71 (1982). Child support payments are not alimony income. I.R.C. §
71(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
80. This is in harmony with the single tax concept that as to all the parties involved, only
one should be taxed on the trust income. See Treas. Reg. § 1.102-1(e) (1988).
81. The definition of the term "income" in I.R.C. § 643(b) (1982) as fiduciary accounting
income is not coordinated with I.R.C. § 682(a) (1982).




distributions can never be charged with realizing a financial benefit for that
year greater than the amounts so distributed. As a result, the maximum amount
of reported income is limited to the amounts distributed.83 Consistent with
this result and consistent with the single tax concept the income distribution
deduction is implementing, the distributing trust or estate can never deduct
an amount greater than the amount of distributions made to beneficiaries.
The income distribution deduction is thus limited to the sum of the following
amounts: (1) the amount of required distributions of current fiduciary ac-
counting income;8 ' (2) the amount of discretionary distributions of current
fiduciary accounting income;" and (3) the amount of required or discretionary
distributions of accumulated income or corpus."
In computing the ceiling on the income distribution deduction, the source
of the distributions is thus not material. The source of the distributions becomes
important only when considering how the distributed DNI is to be allocated
to the recipient-beneficiaries. That is, the source of the distributions is rele-
vant only for purposes of the two-tier structure that provides a mechanism
for determining which beneficiary gets what amount of DNI."1
Use of the income distribution deduction is elective in that it depends on
whether distributions are required or are discretionary. If fiduciary accounting
income is accumulated pursuant to fiduciary direction or discretion given in
the governing instrument and if DNI is not otherwise distributed through re-
quired or discretionary distributions of accumulated income or corpus, then
the trust or estate is not allowed a deduction and is taxed on its taxable income
for the year. Whether to make distributions depends on whether it is desirable
to recognize the trust or estate as a taxable entity with respect to its income
or whether it is desirable to shift that tax to the beneficiaries. This choice
in allocating taxable income between different taxpayers, each with their own
progressive tax rates, depends on the parties' respective marginal tax rates.
As discussed earlier, the benefits of income splitting through the use of trusts
or estates have been substantially lessened since the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The benefits would return quickly, however, if the tax rates were raised in
the future.
Amount of Deduction Limited to Amount of Distributable Net Income (DNI)
As already noted, the overall scheme of the taxation of trusts and estates
is to tax the trust's or estate's taxable income only once, either to the
83. In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Supreme Court equated
income with an accession to wealth, here the amounts distributed and received by the beneficiaries.
This expression is reflected in I.R.C. §§ 652(a) and 662(a) (1982) with respect to distributions
to beneficiaries, and in I.R.C. § 301(b) (1982) with respect to distributions to shareholders.
84. I.R.C. §§ 651(a), 661(a)(1) (1982).
85. I.R.C. § 661(a)(2) (1982).
86. Id.
87. The tier structure is found in I.R.C. § 662(a)(1) and (2) (1982) and is masterfully discussed
in M. FERGUSON, supra note 20, at 386-93 in general terms and at 393-466 in detailed terms.
See also 3 B. BrrrMR, supra note 5, at 81.4.4.
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beneficiary or to the entity depending on whether such taxable income is dis-
tributed. This scheme is carried out by the deduction-inclusion rules which
allocate the tax between the beneficiaries and the trust or estate. Taxable in-
come in the current year that is distributed is taxed to the recipient-beneficiary.
The income distribution deduction allowed the trust or estate for the amount
distributed prevents a second tax at the trust or estate level. To avoid deter-
mining whether a particular distribution consists of current income, accumu-
lated income-or corpus, that is, to avoid tracing the taxable income
distributed-the deduction-inclusion rules provide for a conclusive presump-
tion that any distribution is considered a distribution of the trust's or estate's
taxable income to the extent of such income for the year.' This presumption
is implemented through the use of the concept of distributable net income.
Under this concept, all distributions, whether made from current income,
accumulated income or corpus, are taxed to the recipient-beneficiary and are
deductible by the trust or estate to the extent of the trust's or estate's DNI
for the year. Every distribution is conclusively presumed to have been made
from DNI to the extent of DNI for the year. As a result, all distributions
are treated as first coming out of taxable income to the extent of DNI.1 For
cash distributions, the amount of DNI distributed is the amount of the cash
distributed. For property distributed in kind, special rules discussed below
apply to measure the amount of DNI distributed.
In this statutory scheme, DNI then has a dual function. It measures the
amount deductible by the trust or estate as well as the amount taxable to
the beneficiary. Since the income reported by the beneficiary cannot exceed
the amount of DNI carried out by the distribution, the income distribution
deduction likewise is limited to the amount of DNI distributed. This result
is at the heart of the allocative function of DNI. This dual function of DNI
implements the quantitative flow-through approach to the taxation of trusts
and estates.
Accordingly, the amount of the income distribution deduction available to
a trust or estate for distributions made to beneficiaries, initially limited to
the amounts so distributed, is further limited to the amount of the trust's
or estate's DNI for the year. The working rule thus states that the income
distribution deduction is the lower of (1) the amount distributed or (2) the
trust's or estate's DNI for the year.'" Furthermore, the deduction so deter-
mined is allowed only net of tax-exempt items.
Adjustment for Items Not Included in Gross Income
The amount of DNI available to trigger the income distribution deduction
is reduced by any item in the composition of DNI that is not included in
88. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
89. I.R.C. § 661(a) (1982) (flush language). Note the use of a similar presumption in the
determination of dividend distributions of corporate earnings and profits, I.R.C. § 316(a) (1982).
90. I.R.C. § 661(a) (1982). Compare the similar treatment of corporate distributions in I.R.C.
§§ 301(b) and 301(c)(1) (1982). Dividend income received by a shareholder cannot exceed the




the gross income of the trust or estate. 9' This is the rule if, under the govern-
ing instrument, all current income is distributed, as in the case of simple
trusts. 92 If, however, the amount distributed is less than DNI for the year,
as is possible with complex trusts and estates, the reduction is applied to the
lower of (1) the amount distributed or (2) the DNI for the year.93 If the distribu-
tion of the tax-exempt income is not specifically earmarked,9" it is deemed
distributed on a pro-rata basis for purposes of calculating the adjustment to
the income distribution deduction.
95
The effect of the downward adjustment to the income distribution deduction
is to prevent the trust or estate from deducting items distributed which if re-
tained by the trust or estate would not have been taxed to it. This rule thus
prevents a double tax benefit accruing to the entity-a deduction as well as
an exclusion with regard to the same item of income. This treatment is in
harmony with the conduit function of the income distribution deduction.
Since that function is to allocate the tax on trust or estate income between
the entity and the beneficiary, it has no role to play when income is not sub-
ject to taxation. Consequently, the income distribution deduction cannot exceed
the portion of the distribution consisting of income subject to taxation.
91. This rule is based on the qualitative flow-through function of DNI in I.R.C. §§ 652(b),
661(b), and 662(b) (1982).
92. I.R.C. § 651(b) (1982). Thus, if under the terms of the trust instrument, income is to
be distributed currently to beneficiary B, and if during the taxable year the trust reports $40,000
of rental income, $10,000 of tax-exempt income, and no expenses, the income distribution deduction
equals $40,000: the lower of (1) $50,000 amount distributed, or (2) $50,000 DNI less the $10,000
tax-exempt income item in DNI that is not included in the gross income of the trust.
93. I.R.C. § 661(c) (1982). By contrast I.R.C. § 651(b) (1982) applies the reduction in the
case of simple trusts solely to DNI, supra note 92. The phrasing in section 65 1(b) (1982) is possible
because, generally speaking, distributions from simple trusts will equal DNI.
94. To illustrate, assume that the trust reports during the taxable year $40,000 of rental in-
come, $10,000 of tax-exempt income, and no expenses. Under the terms of the trust instrument,
trust income may be accumulated or distributed to beneficiary B in the trustee's discretion, but
that trustee must distribute all tax-exempt income. The trustee distributes $30,000 to B during
the year. The income distribution deduction will equal $20,000: the lower of (1) the amount
distributed ($30,000) reduced by the tax-exempt item ($10,000), or (2) DNI ($50,000).
Alternatively, if no tax-exempt income may be distributed and the trustee distributes $30,000
to B, the income distribution deduction equals $30,000. No reduction is made because no tax-
exempt item is passed through to the beneficiary.
95. Thus, if in the previous example the trustee distributed $30,000, the income distribution
deduction will equal $24,000, calculated as follows: first, the reduction applied to the lower of
the amount distributed ($30,000) or DNI ($50,000) is the amount of tax-exempt income distributed;
second, the amount of the tax-exempt income distributed bears the same ratio to the total amount
distributed as the total amount of tax-exempt items (the total potential reduction) bears to DNI.
Thus,
tax-exempt income distributed = total tax-exempt items, or
total distribution DNI
reduction = all tax-free items x all distributions
DNI
reduction = $10,000 x $30,000
$50,000
reduction = $6,000.
See example in Treas. Reg. § 1.661(c)-2, especially (e) (1988).
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cannot exceed the portion of the distribution consisting of income subject
to taxation.
Given the purpose for the adjustment, tax-free receipts that do not enter
into DNI are not taken into account when making the adjustment. This in-
cludes tax-free receipts such as life insurance proceeds, 96 gifts and bequests,
and corpus distributions received from other trusts or estates. 9" These items
do not make up DNI and are thus not part of the adjustment.98 One tax-free
receipt that does enter into DNI, however, is tax-exempt income. 99 This means
that the type of item that reduces DNI for purposes of the income distribution
deduction is generally limited to tax-exempt income.
Furthermore, only the net amount of the tax-exempt income distributed
reduces the income distribution deduction. Accordingly, expenses incurred by
the trust or estate allocable to the tax-exempt income are taken into account
when determining the adjustment because even though such expenses are
disallowed for tax purposes,' 0 they nevertheless enter into the DNI calcula-
tions and help characterize the net amounts distributed.' 0 '
For purposes of the DNI adjustment, how trust or estate expenses are
allocated to tax-exempt items-in DNI becomes very important. Moreover, the
interest of the entity on the one hand and that of the beneficiaries on the
other are in opposition with regard to the manner of allocation. That is because
taking expenses allocable to tax-exempt income into account does not alter
the total amount of DNI.'0 2 Because total DNI is not affected, the allocation
of such expenses affects only the mix of the net amounts of tax-exempt and
taxable-income items in DNI. To the extent trust or estate expenses are
allocated to tax-exempt income, a lesser amount of such expenses remain to
be allocated to the taxable income. The fewer the expenses allocated to taxable
income, the more such income may be distributed and deducted by the trust
or estate because the income distribution deduction is keyed to the portion
of the distribution consisting of income subject to taxation. From the point
of view of the trust or estate, reducing the tax-exempt items, and hence the
adjustment to the income distribution deduction, is beneficial. This means,
however, that a greater amount of income will be taxed to the beneficiaries.
If the trust or estate distribution is equal to or greater than DNI, this alloca-
tion has a neutral effect on the computation of the income distribution deduc-
tion. Since all of the income is distributed, it is not material for purposes
of the deduction to note the net items comprising DNI.10 The method of
96. I.R.C. § 101(a) (1982).
97. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1982).
98. Tax-exempt receipts generally do not form part of DNI because the starting point for
computing DNI is taxable income, I.R.C. § 643(a) (1982). For a detailed discussion of the rules
for determining which items enter into DNI, see M. FERGusON, supra note 20, ch. 5.
99. I.R.C. § 643(a)(5) (1982).
100. I.R.C. § 265(a)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 1986).
101. I.R.C. §§ 643(a)(5) (1982); 643(a) (Supp. IV 1986); 651(b) (1982); 661(b) and (c) (1982).
102. M. FERGUSON, supra note 20, at 333-34, 484.
103. Of course, the beneficiaries might care about the mix of net items in DNI.
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allocation becomes consequential only in cases when all income is not
distributed. In such cases, the general rules for allocating expenses to items
comprising DNI are followed."- ' Thus, an expense is taken into account even
if for fiduciary accounting purposes it is chargeable to corpus.,0 5 The effect
of an additional expense is to further reduce the net tax-exempt income, lower-
ing the adjustment and hence increasing the available income distribution
deduction. Also, because general expenses are not allocated to tax-free items
that do not enter DNI (such as life insurance proceeds and capital gains),
the allocation of general expenses is not diluted by the presence of such corpus
items. 06 The result, again, is a lower net tax-exempt item and a larger income
distribution deduction.
Finally, general expenses, such as fiduciary fees, state income taxes, and
attorney's fees for general services, are allocated on a pro-rata basis to the
tax-exempt income on the basis of the ratio such income bears to the total
amount of fiduciary accounting income.'07 However, when allocating general
expenses, whether gross fiduciary accounting income or such income less direct
expenses is used in the ratio is not altogether clear.' 8 The choice may be
signficant. The use of the gross amount dilutes the amount of expenses
allocated to the tax-exempt items and thus increases the amount of the available
income distribution deduction." 9
104. M. FERGUSON, supra note 20, at 484-85.
105. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.643(d)-2(a)(2) (example); 1.662(c)-4(c) (1988) (example).
106. The allocations are exclusively to DNI items per I.R.C. § 651(b), 661(c) (1982); Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.652(b)-3(b), 1.652(c)-4 (1988) (example). See also Tucker v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'g 38 T.C. 955 (1962); Rev. Rul. 77-355 C.B. 82.
107. I.R.C. § 643(a)(5) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.643(d)-2(a)(2) (1988); Manufacturers Hanover
Tr. Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 785 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Rev. Rul. 63-27, 1963-1 C.B. 57.
108. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.652(b)-3(b) (1988) (fiduciary accounting income net of direct
expenses) with Treas. Reg. § 1.661(c)-2 (1988) (example) (gross fiduciary accounting income).
For support of the use of the gross amount, see further Treas. Reg. §§ 1.652(c)-4, 1.662(c)-4,
1.643(d)-2(a)(2) (1988).
109. To illustrate, assume that under the terms of the trust instrument, income may in the
trustee's discretion be accumulated or distributed to beneficiary B. Also, expenses are allocated
against income, and the trust instrument requires a reserve for depreciation. During the year
the trustee distributes $20,000 of income to B and allocates general expenses to rental income
except for amounts required to be allocated to tax-exempt income. The trust has the following
receipts and expenses for the year:
Life insurance proceeds ........................................... $200,000
Rental income ................................................... 60,000
Dividends ....................................................... 10,000
Tax-exempt income .............................................. 30,000
Rental expense ................................................... 46,000
Depreciation ..................................................... 4,000
Trustee's fees .................................................... 10,000
The trust's DNI for the year is $40,000, composed as follows:




- 7,000 trustee's fees -3,000
$ 3,000 $10,000 $27,000
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2-Percent Floor on Itemized Deductions
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress limited the use of certain
itemized deductions." 0 The income distribution deduction, however, is not
limited by this new provision. The General Explanation of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 confirms this and notes that a technical correction to the Act
may be necessary for the statute to reflect this intent."' This interpretation
is appropriate given the different purposes of the income distribution deduction
and the limitation on certain itemized deductions.
Distributions in Kind
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 fully revised the treatment of distributions
of property (other than cash) made by trusts or estates to beneficiaries.
1 2
Regarding the income distribution deduction, the rule as amended now pro-
vides that the amount of the distribution eligible for the deduction is the lesser
of (1) the basis of the property distributed in the hands of the beneficiary
or (2) the fair market value of such property.' The basis of the distributed
property in the hands of the beneficiary is the same as the basis of such prop-
erty in the hands of the trust or estate immediately before the distribution,
adjusted for any gain or loss recognized to the trust or estate on the distribu-
tion. 14 Generally speaking, a trust or estate does not recognize gain or loss
on distributions of property, unless the fiduciary elects otherwise. Thus, the
general rule can be restated as follows: the amount of the distribution eligible
for the distribution deduction is the lower of (1) the property's basis to the
trust or estate or (2) its fair market value.
If gain property is distributed, the amount of the distribution is as a general
rule the trust's or estate's basis in that property. For purposes of calculating
If gross fiduciary accounting income is used in the allocation ratio, the portion of general ex-
penses allocated to tax-exempt interest is based on the following ratio:
Gross tax-exempt interest x Amount of general expenses
Gross fiduciary income
Because the trustee distributes $20,000 to beneficiary B, the beneficiary receives one-half of each
item in DNI. The potential distribution deduction is then the lower of (1) $20,000 or (2) DNI
of $40,000. This amount is reduced by $13,500 (1/2 of $27,000 net tax-exempt income item
in DNI) to $6,500. The distribution deduction consists of $1,500 rental income and $5,000 divi-
dend income, the items in DNI distributed and subject to taxation.
If the allocation is based on net fiduciary accounting income, the ratio would be 30/50, after
taking into account the direct expenses of rental and depreciation. As a result, $6,000 of the
general expenses are allocated to the tax-exempt income and $4,000 to the taxable income. This
leaves the trust with a $24,000 tax-free item in DNI and a $12,000 adjustment to the distribution
deduction, which now is $8,000 (compared to $6,500 in the gross ratio example above).
110. I.R.C. § 67 (Supp. IV 1986).
111. GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra note 4, at 80. This correction was made with the Technical
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988; see I.R.C. § 67(e)(2), as added by Pub. L. No. 647,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1001(f)(3) (1988). Thus, the deduction will be calculated before the
application of the 2-percent floor.
112. I.R.C. § 643(e) (Supp. IV 1986) (added by Pub. L. No. 369, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., §
81(a) (1984)).
113. I.R.C. § 643(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
114. I.R.C. § 643(e)(2)(A) & (e)(l) (Supp. IV 1986).
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the amount of the distribution, an amount equal to the property's basis is
treated as distributed. The effect of this new rule is to limit the amount of
income carried out to a beneficiary with the distribution of an appreciated
asset and hence also to limit the income distribution deduction available to
the entity with respect to such a distribution.1 3
A collateral effect is to preserve DNI for other distributions during the year.
If loss property is distributed, the amount distributed is always the fair market
value of such property, even when taxability is elected." 6
The general rule applies unless the fiduciary, in his judgment, elects to treat
the distribution as a taxable sale to the beneficiary.' In such an event, the
amount of the distribution will always equal the fair market value of the prop-
erty." 8 Once made, the election to intentionally incur gain applies to all
distributions made by the trust or estate during the year." 9 The fiduciary is
not allowed an asset-by-asset election and thus cannot pick and choose the
mix in his amounts of distributions. The election is made on the trust's or
estate's tax return for the year of the distribution. Any election, once made,
may be revoked only with the consent of the Commissioner.' 20
If the fiduciary elects to recognize the gain on the transfer, such gain prob-
ably will be capital gain, will be allocated to corpus and will not enter into
DNI, except in cases of terminating distributions. 12' Accordingly, the election
itself will not be a separate source of additions to DNI that could potentially
trigger a larger income distribution deduction."'
Unless the fiduciary elects taxability, distributions of property in kind will
carry out DNI and will be deductible in the amount of the bases in the properties
115. This new rule overturns Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f)(2) (1988), which called for an amount
of distribution equal to the property's fair market value. Under prior law, this result also allowed
the beneficiary a step-up in basis to the property's fair market value. This result, too, is over-
turned by the new rule, which allots the beneficiary a carryover basis. I.R.C. § 643(e)(1) (Supp.
IV 1986).
116. I.R.C. § 643(e)(2)(B), (3)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986). To illustrate, assuming the distribution
is not a taxable event, if a trust or estate distributes property with a fair market value of $100
and an adjusted basis at the time of the distribution of $60, the amount of the distribution,
subject to available DNI, is $60. Had the fair market value of the property been $40, the income
distribution deduction accordingly would have been limited to $40.
Note that to treat the distribution as a sale of the loss property will not result in loss recogni-
tion to the entity per I.R.C. § 267(a)(1), (b)(5).
117. I.R.C. § 643(e)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
118. I.R.C. § 643(e)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986). This treatment accorded the trust or estate
is analogous to the treatment of corporate distributions of appreciated property after the repeal
of the General Utilities doctrine in I.R.C. §§ 311 & 336 (Supp. IV 1986). To illustrate, if a
trust or estate distributes property to a beneficiary with a basis of $60 and fair market value
of $100 and if the fiduciary elects to recognize the gain on the distribution, the amount of the
distribution eligible for the deduction steps up to $100.
119. I.R.C. § 643(e)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1986), added by Pub. L. No. 514, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 1806(a) (1986).
120. I.R.C. §§ 643(e)(3)(B) & 643(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
121. I.R.C. § 643(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
122. To continue the corporate tax analogy, see the different treatment accorded in-kind cor-
porate distributions in I.R.C. § 312(b) (Supp. IV 1986). The appreciation in the asset distributed
increases earnings and profits.
1989]
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in the hands of the entity. This is the result even if the properties distributed
are equal in value. To illustrate, if the fiduciary distributes two assets each
worth $100 but with bases of $20 and $60, respectively, the entity's income
distribution deduction cannot exceed $80, even though economically speak-
ing the distributions are level.123 The beneficiaries will have a particular interest
in who gets what asset since they will receive the properties with a carryover
basis. To maximize his income distribution deduction, and at the same time
neutralize any undue influence from the beneficiaries, the fiduciary may wish
to choose the year in which a particular asset will be distributed.
The new approach to property distributions enacted by the Tax Reform
Act of 1984 overturns prior law on this point found in the regulations.'
24
To what extent these regulations not specifically in conflict with the new rules
remain viable, however, is unclear.2 Specifically, the regulations provide for
a cash-first rule applicable when the total amount of cash and property
distributed during the year exceeds the DNI for the year. In such instances,
the DNI is applied first to the cash, with any excess available applied to the
property distributed. Under the regulations, DNI is not applied proportionately
to each separate distribution.
126
If the cash-first rule still applies, the income distribution deduction may
remain limited even if the fiduciary elects to recognize gain on the distribu-
tion. To illustrate, assume the fiduciary distributes $10,000 in cash and $10,000
worth of property with a $6,000 basis. DNI for the year is $16,000. The
distribution deduction is limited to $16,000 and is comprised of the $10,000
cash and $6,000 basis. The answer remains the same if the fiduciary elects
taxability because the first $10,000 in the deduction is attributable to the cash.
For purposes of the income distribution deduction, the election becomes ir-
relevant and the gain is unnecessarily incurred.
The new in-kind distribution rules affirmatively provide for the determination
of the amount of the distribution. The amount is specifically stated to be
either the basis in the property or its fair market value, depending upon the
applicable scenario. By its own terms, the rules do not provide any guidance
on how to treat distributions of encumbered property. A reasonable argument
is that despite the silence in the statute, the amount of the distribution eligible
for the deduction should reflect a net position. This interpretation is suggested
and supported by the treatment of corporate distributions of mortgaged prop-
erty to shareholders.' 2 This interpretation is also consistent with the adjustment
to the income distribution deduction for items not included in gross income
discussed earlier. For purposes of that adjustment, only the net amount of
123. In essence, what is taken into account is historic value, i.e., basis, not current value.
124. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f)(2) (1988).
125. For example, Treas. Reg. § 1.661-2(f)(1) (1988), dealing with property transfers in satisfac-
tion of a pecuniary bequest, is still applicable. See infra note 131.
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f)(3) (1988).
127. I.R.C. § 301(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
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the tax-free item in DNI was taken into account because only the net amount
accurately reflects the economic value distributed." 8
The in-kind distribution rules discussed here do not apply to property
transfers falling outside the purview of the general distribution rules, such
as charitable transfers or specific gifts or bequests of property.'29 Nor do they
apply to transfers of property in satisfaction of a specific bequest of another
property. For example, if Whiteacre is distributed instead of a specific be-
quest of Blackacre, the trust or estate is treated as having first made a con-
structive transfer of Blackacre in satisfaction of the specific nondeductible
bequest, followed by the taxable sale of Whiteacre for Blackacre.' 3° Likewise,
prior law rules governing gifts of appreciated property to charitable organiza-
tions will continue to apply.'
3'
The amendment to the in-kind distribution rules by the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 did not change the treatment under prior law of transfers made in
satisfaction of pecuniary bequests.' 32 Such transfers will continue to be treated
as first consisting of a constructive distribution of the dollar entitlement,
followed by a taxable purchase by the beneficiary of the property actually
transferred. 133 The availability of the income distribution deduction, and the
application of the property distribution rules, depends on the specificity of
the pecuniary bequest. If the pecuniary bequest is a specific dollar amount,
the trust is not allowed an income distribution deduction for the transfer and
the property distribution rules are neither triggered nor needed. 34 However,
if the dollar entitlement of the beneficiary is not specific, then the construc-
tive cash distribution is deductible subject to available DNI. '
3
To summarize, the in-kind distribution rules do not apply to property
transfers in satisfaction of specific property or pecuniary bequests. They do
apply to property distributions in satisfaction of pecuniary bequests of undeter-
mined dollar amounts or of bequests of unidentified property because the
128. See supra notes 83 and 84.
129. I.R.C. § 643(e)(4) (Supp. IV 1986), referring to transfers governed by I.R.C. § 663(a)
(1982). The in-kind distribution rules need not apply since such property transfers are not deduc-
tible by the trust or estate.
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(a)-2(f)(1) (1988) and Rev. Rul. 69-486, 1969-2 C.B. 159.
131. GENERA. EXPLANATiON, 1984, supra note 14, at 254.
132. Id. at 255-56.
133. Kenan v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp.
113 (D. Conn. 1935), aff'd, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 573 (1936).
See also Rev. Rul. 82-4, 1982-1 C.B. 99, Rev. Rul. 69-432, 1969-2 C.B. 144, and Rev. Rul.
67-74, 1967-1 C.B. 194.
134. I.R.C. § 643(e)(4) (1982), referring to I.R.C. § 663(a) (1982). To illustrate, assume the
fiduciary transfers property in satisfaction of an obligation imposed by the governing instrument
to distribute $20,000 to a beneficiary. The property has a fair market value of $20,000 and a
basis of $8,000. The fiduciary is deemed first to have made the specific cash distribution, which
is not eligible for the income distribution deduction as a specific bequest, followed by a sale
of the property in exchange for $20,000 in cash. The fiduciary thus must report a gain of $12,000
on the sale without an offsetting deduction for the distribution.
135. In the above example, the fiduciary will thus report a $20,000 income distribution deduc-
tion in addition to the $12,000 gain. See Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 C.B. 194.
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income distribution deduction is available for such distributions. Formula be-
quests, particularly marital deduction clauses, are illustrative of the latter two
types of transfers. 136 Whether the transfer is called for under a pecuniary for-
mula clause or a fractional share formula, the transfer is eligible for the in-
come distribution deduction. 31 Under a pecuniary formula, the cash deemed
constructively distributed is the amount of the distribution. 38 Under a frac-
tional share formula, the lower of the property's basis or fair market value
is the amount of the distribution. 139 Since the distribution is not a taxable
exchange under the Kenan doctrine,' in the case of gain property distributed
the basis figure is not adjusted upward to fair market value,' " unless the
fiduciary elects to treat the distribution as a taxable sale. 42 In such event,
the income distribution deduction equals the fair market value of the property,
subject to available DNI.1
43
A further illustration of a pecuniary bequest of an undetermined dollar
amount is a tier-one distribution of a complex trust or estate. 44 If the fiduciary
satisfies the obligation to distribute all current income with the distribution
of property, the distribution is again treated as a cash distribution followed
by a sale of the property to the beneficiary. 5 Because this is a cash distribu-
tion, the in-kind distribution rules are not needed. This is why the in-kind
distribution rule only applies to tier-two distributions, such as fractional share
or residual formula distributions of property.
46
Two final points must be made, one dealing with installment obligations
and the other with income in respect of a decedent (IRD). If the trust or
estate distributes an installment note from a sale made by the fiduciary (thus
not an IRD item), the distribution of the note to the beneficiary is a taxable
disposition of the note accelerating the gain to be reported on the installment
sale.' 4 7 Because gain is recognized by the trust or estate on the distribution,
the amount of the income distribution deduction will always be the fair market
value of the note, subject to available DNI. '4 This will be the result whether
or not the fiduciary makes the election to treat the distribution as a taxable
sale. As a result, the election is meaningless in this situation. To give the
136. Formula bequests are not within the inheritance exclusion of I.R.C. § 663(a) (1982).
137. Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286. See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.663(a)-l(b)(1), 1.1014°4(a)(3)
(1988).
138. See authority supra at note 133 and Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286.
139. I.R.C. § 643(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
140. See authority supra at notes 133 and 137.
141. I.R.C. § 643(e)(1)03) (Supp. IV 1986).
142. I.R.C. § 643(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
143. I.R.C. § 643(e)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986).
144. A tier-one distribution is a required distribution of current income. I.R.C. § 661(a)(1)
(Supp. IV 1986).
145. Rev. Rul. 67-74, 1967-1 C.B. 194, dealing with simple trust distributions, is equally ap-
plicable here.
146. I.R.C. § 643(e) (Supp. IV 1986) only refers to § 661(a)(2)-type distributions, i.e., tier-two
distributions.
147. I.R.C. § 453B(a) (Supp. IV 1986).




election vitality, however, an argument could be made that distributions of
installment notes should be governed after enactment of the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 by the more specific rules applicable to in-kind property distributions
by trusts or estates, rather than by the installment sales rules applicable to
dispositions of installment notes generally. The issue at hand is the timing with
regard to the gain inherent in the installment note. If the gain on the install-
ment note is not accelerated, then the income distribution deduction is limited
to the basis in the installment note distributed.
A similar issue is raised concerning the applicability of two opposing
statutory schemes with regard to income in respect of the decedent (IRD).
The weight of decisional authority currently provides that distributions of IRD
items fall outside the in-kind distribution rules.1 49 If the property distribution
rules were to apply, the fiduciary could elect to accelerate the income
represented by the IRD. In such case, the income distribution deduction would
equal the amount of the income, the same amount that would then be taxed
to the recipient-beneficiary. If IRD is treated separately and apart from the
distribution rules, then the fiduciary will report no deduction on the transfer
of the IRD and the beneficiary will report the income when the IRD is actually
collected in later years. Again, the issue is a matter of timing.
Character of Amounts Distributed
The income distribution deduction allowed to a trust or estate is a
nondescript deduction taken by the entity in its final calculations in arriving
at its taxable income." ' The deduction is not allocated as such against dif-
ferent types of income. The Code does speak, however, of the character of
the amounts distributed"' and the regulations of the character of the amounts
retained by the trust or estate.' This does not mean that the income distribu-
tion deduction is to be prorated to different categories of income and allowed
only against such income. Rather, the characterization called for by the statute
is related to the qualitative flow-through of the conduit approach to the taxa-
tion of trusts and estates. The characterization of the income distribution
deduction is part of a larger computation of the character of the net amounts
that comprise DNI.5 3 As to the income distribution deduction, the character
149. See discussion infra in part VI.
150. The income distribution deduction is taken on line 17 of the Fiduciary Income Tax Return.
See supra note 1. In calculating its taxable income, a trust or estate first determines its tentative
taxable income (gross income less deductions other than deductions under I.R.C. § 661 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986), 642(b) (Supp. IV 1986), 691(c) (1982), and then turns to the distribution
deduction, followed by the personal exemption in I.R.C. § 642(b) and deduction for estate taxes
paid in I.R.C. § 691(c).
151. I.R.C. § 661(b) (Supp. IV 1986). No counterpart is found in I.R.C. § 651(b) (1982).
None is needed because, generally, a simple trust distributes all its DNI. Attention to the character
of amounts distributed and retained is only called for when not all of the DNI is distributed,
as is possible with complex trusts and estates.
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.661(c)-2 (1988) (example).
153. See M. FERGuSON, supra note 20, at 333, 468-76.
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of the amounts distributed are relevant only for purposes of determining the
adjustment to the DNI limitation on the deduction previously discussed.,
IV. Taxable Year of Income Distribution Deduction
The timing of the income distribution deduction allowed a trust or estate
depends on the tier source of the distribution. Required distributions of cur-
rent income, tier-one distributions, are deducted in the year the distributions
are required to be made, whether or not actually made. This is so even if




Tier-two distributions, on the other hand, are deducted in the year actually
made. ,56 Again, to facilitate administrative convenience, tier-two distribution
made by a trust (but not an estate) will be deemed actually made in a prior
year if the trustee so elects under the 65-day rule discussed below. The timing
of the income distribution deduction is thus independent of the method of
accounting used by the trust or estate for purposes of reporting other items
of income and disbursements.
Complex Trust Distributions: 65-Day Rule
Although complex trust distributions are deductible in the year actually
made, they may be retroactively applied to the previous year if the trustee
so elects. A trustee may, in his discretion, elect to treat an amount paid within
the first 65 days of any taxable year as actually paid on the last day of the
preceding taxable year.'
5 7
The election allows the trustee an opportunity to monitor distributions on
account of a taxable year after the close of that year and to make such distribu-
tions with a fuller understanding of that year's income and DNI amounts.
The election enables the trustee to retroactively avoid accumulating income
and avoid the possible application of the throwback rules to such income. IS
Because the throwback rules do not apply to estates, the 65-day rule is need-
ed only with respect to complex trust distributions to tier-two beneficiaries. 5 9
Similarly, tier-one distributions are not covered by the 65-day rule because
their timing is determined without reference to whether actual distributions
are made.'" °
The election is made on an annual basis and is effective only with respect
to the taxable year for which the election is made.'I' The election with respect
to a taxable year of a trust is applicable only to those amounts properly paid
154. Note that I.R.C. § 661(c) (Supp. IV 1986) refers to I.R.C. § 661(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
155. I.R.C. §§ 651(a), 661(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986) and Treas. Reg. §§ 1.651(a)-2(a), 1.663(a)-3
(1988).
156. I.R.C. § 661(a)(2) (1982).
157. I.R.C. § 663(b)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.663(b)-1 (1988).
158. For reading on the throwback rule, see supra note 24.
159. By its own terms, I.R.C. § 663(b)(1) (1982) applies only to trust distributions.
160. See authority supra at note 155.




or credited within the first sixty-five days following the close of such year
and so designated by the fiduciary in his election. 162 The amount so designated
cannot be greater than: (1) the amount of the fiduciary accounting income
of the trust for the year for which the election is made; or (2) the amount
of DNI for such year. 63 The year for which the election is made is the previous
year to which the distribution will be related, not the year in which the distribu-
tion was otherwise made within the 65-day period. 6 The cap on the amount
deemed retroactively distributed is applied with respect to this previous year's
income and DNI amounts. Moreover, the cap on the amount to which the
election applies is reduced by any amounts paid, credited, or required to be
distributed in such previous year.1 65 This limitation on the amount eligible
for the election carries out the purpose of the election, which is to retroac-
tively prevent unintended accumulations of income in the previous year whose
later distribution would trigger the throwback rules. Such undue accumula-
tions arise only if the greater of fiduciary accounting income or DNI is not
fully distributed.
66
Once a proper election is made with respect to any distribution, such dis-
tribution shall be treated as actually having been made in the previous year
for all other purposes. 67 This makes the previous year the relevant year for
determining the amount of the income distribution deduction as well as the
timing of the deduction. This also means that the amount is not deemed
distributed within the 65-day period for purposes of applying the election cap
with respect to the year within which the 65-day period ends, if such year
itself becomes an election year in the future.' 61
V. Separate Trust Shares as Separate Trusts
For the sole purpose of computing DNI, separate shares of a trust will be
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(b)-l(a)(2)(ii) (1988).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(b)-l(a)(2)(i)(a), (b) (1988).
164. The trustee must elect for the designation under the 65-day rule on the tax return for
the year for which the election is made. Thus the election must be made no later than the time
prescribed for filing the return for the previous year, including extensions thereof. Once made,
the election is irrevocable after the last day for filing the return. I.R.C. § 663(b)(2) (1982); Treas.
Reg. § 1.663(b)-2(a)(1) (1988). If no return is required for the year, a statement must be filed
in lieu of a return in the same manner and time. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(b)-2(a)(2) (1988). If the
trustee does elect, he is not committed to the election in subsequent years. Treas. Reg. §
1.663(b)-l(a)(2)(i) (1988).
165. Id.
166. See 3 B. BrrncaR, supra note 5, at 81.5.2.
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(b)-l(a)(2)(ii) (1988); Rev. Rul. 78-158, 1978-1 C.B. 437.
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(b)-1(a)(2)(i) (1988). To illustrate, assume that in year one a trust
has DNI of $10,000 and fiduciary accounting income of $9,000. The trustee distributes $5,000
within the first sixty-five days of year one and elects to designate the amount as distributed
in a previous year. The trustee further distributes $3,000 during year one and another $8,000
within the first sixty-five days of year two. The maximum amount of the year two distribution
that may be designated as distributed in year one is $7,000 ($10,000 - $3,000). The trustee,
of course, is not bound to designate the maximum amount and may elect a smaller amount.
See also example in Treas. Reg. § 1.663(b)-l(a)(2)(i) (1988).
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treated as separate trusts. '69 This rule limits the income distribution deduction
where income is accumulated for two or more beneficiaries, but a distribution
is made to a beneficiary in excess of that beneficiary's share of income to
which he would have been entitled had he been a beneficiary of a separate
trust.'70
The separate share rule is triggered whenever distributions of a trust are
made in substantially the same manner as if separate trusts had been created. 17'
This occurs whenever payment of income, accumulated income, or corpus
of a share of one beneficiary cannot affect the proprotionate share of income,
accumulated income, or corpus of any other beneficiary. In other words, this
occurs whenever the trustee may not dip into one beneficiary's share for the
benefit of another beneficiary unless substantially proper adjustment is made
so that substantially separate and independent shares exist.172 The rule also
may apply to successive interests in point of time.'"
This rule is not elective' 7 and applies even though separate books of account
are not maintained by the trustee and no physical segregation of assets is made
or required. 71 In determining whether a separate share exists, it is not material
that more than one beneficiary has an interest in a separate share, or that
the same beneficiary has an interest in more than one share. 7 ' Likewise, it
is not material to whom a separate share will be distributed upon the death
of the beneficiary of that share.
177
In applying the separate share rule, the DNI for each separate share is com-
puted separately. Deductions and losses applicable to one share are thus not
available to any other share of the same trust.'" The separate share rule only
relates to the computation of DNI and hence to the income distribution deduc-
tion. The trust will be treated as a single entity for all other purposes, in-
cluding the filing of returns and payment of taxes. 79 The rule does not apply
169. I.R.C. § 663(c) (1982). A separate share rule also exists for the generation-skipping tax
in I.R.C. § 2654(b) (Supp. IV 1986), and for grantor power to control beneficial enjoyment
over corpus in I.R.C. § 674(b)(5)(B) (1982).
170. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-1(a) (1988); Rev. Rul. 74-299, 1974-1 C.B. 154.
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(a) (1988).
172. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(b) and (d) (1988). To illustrate, assume that under the terms
of the trust instrument, income is to be distributed to three equal beneficiaries. Also, the trustee
may invade corpus for the benefit of any beneficiary to the extent of that beneficiary's share
in the trust. In such event, the beneficiary's right to future income and corpus will be propor-
tionately reduced. During the year, the trust has DNI of $30,000 and distributes $20,000 to
beneficiary B. The trust's income distribution deduction is limited to $10,000, the amount of
DNI in B's separate, one-third share of the trust. See example in Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-4 (1988).
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(e) (1988).
174. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-1(c) (1988).
175. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-1(d) (1988).
176. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(c) (1988).
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(a) (1988).
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-2 (1988).




to estates,' 8 simple trusts,' 8 ' or situations in which the trust instrument itself
creates separate trusts. '
VI. Nondeductible Distributions
Distributions of specific gifts or bequests are not deductible by the trust
or estate. Neither are charitable transfers or transfers of property passing directly
to heirs without administration by the executor. Finally, distributions to
beneficiaries of a right to receive income in respect of the decedent likewise
are nondeductible distributions.
Gifts or Bequests of a Specific Sum of Money
or of Specific Property
Gross income of an individual does not include the value of property ac-
quired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.' 83.This exclusion does not apply,
however, to a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance of income from property.
1 84
The DNI concept is intended to distinguish between these two types of receipts
in the context of transfers made by trusts and estates.' 8 Distributions by a
trust or estate in excess of DNI or distributions of corpus as specific gifts
or bequests are not transfers of income from property and hence are not income
to the recipients. If such distributions are not income to the beneficiaries who
receive them, then accordingly such distributions are not deductible by the
trust or estate. This result is in harmony with the purpose of the income dis-
tribution deduction, which is to allocate the tax with regard to taxable income
between the trust or estate and the beneficiaries. The treatment of distribu-
tions that come out of DNI was discussed earlier. The topic discussed here
deals with the treatment of specific gifts and bequests.
In general, no income distribution deduction is allowed a trust or estate
for a gift or bequest of a specific sum of money or of specific property required
to be made by the specific terms of the will or trust instrument and properly
paid or credited to a beneficiary.' 86 If under the terms of the will or trust
instrument the gift or bequest is to be paid or credited to the beneficiary in
more than three installments, however, the disallowance will not apply and
the general distribution rules will apply.' 87 The prerequisites for the disallow-
ance of the income distribution deduction are as follows: (1) the transfer of
180. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(f) (1988).
181. By its own terms I.R.C. § 663(c) (1982) only refers to the computation made under sec-
tion 661 and 662, the provision dealing with the income distribution deduction of complex trusts.
182. See Robert L. Moody Tr. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 932 (1976).
183. I.R.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
184. I.R.C. § 102(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
185. I.R.C. § 102(b) (Supp. IV 1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.102-1(d) (1988). See also Irwin v. Gavit,
268 U.S. 161 (1925).
186. I.R.C. § 663(a)(1) (1982), referring to the nonapplicability of I.R.C. § 661, which pro-
vides for the income distribution deduction.
187. I.R.C. § 663(a)(1) (1982).
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money or property must be properly paid or credited under the terms of the
governing instrument as a gift or bequest; (2) the transfer must be specifically
identifiable; (3) the transfer must be paid or credited all at once or in not
more than three installments; and (4) the transfer must not be paid or credited
only from the income of the estate or trust. Each of these prerequisites is
discussed later in the article.
The effect of the disallowance is to treat specific gifts and bequests as trust
or estate distributions that fall outside the general distribution rules. In receiving
predesignated property, the beneficiary does not have any interest in any other
item of the trust or estate, particularly its income. Consequently, the transfer
does not become part of the deduction-inclusion regime of the taxation of
trusts and estates.' 8' A collateral effect is that to the extent a transfer of prop-
erty or money is not deductible by the trust or estate, the trust's or estate's
DNI is preserved to be applied to other distributions made by the entity during
the year.' s 9
Gift or Bequest
Transfers that are nondeductible distributions by the trust or estate must
be properly made pursuant to specific terms of the will or trust instrument.90
A valid will is thus a prerequisite for the disallowance of the income distribution
deduction. Accordingly, neither intestate transfers nor transfers of property
that pass directly to beneficiaries outside the will or trust instrument"' are
within the reach of this rule.8 2
Under the rule, the transfers must be made by a gift or bequest."13 Because
these are terms of art in a federal statute, they must be given their federal
meaning rather than local law characterization.' 9" The transfers must proceed
from a detached and disinterested generosity, out of affection, respect, admira-
tion, charity, or like impulses.'" Transfers to creditors as such are not within
this rule. This does not mean, however, that transfers to creditors otherwise
convert to deductible distributions, as discussed earlier.
Finally, although the provision refers only to bequests, a term that technically
applies only to transfers of personal property,"16 it no doubt also applies to
devises of real property. This interpretation is consistent with the disallowance
of the income distribution deduction regarding direct transfers of realty.
188. Compare I.R.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1986) with § 102(b) (flush language).
189. Because the nondeductible distribution does not use up DNI (see I.R.C. § 663(a) (1982)
making § 661 inapplicable), more DNI is available for the application of the inner ceiling limita-
tion in I.R.C. § 661(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (flush language).
190. I.R.C. § 661(a)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(a) (1988).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(c)(1)(ii) (1988). Such transfers, unlike intestate transfers, do not
as a result then become eligible for the deduction.
192. Intestate transfers, as a result, are governed by the general distribution rules and are
eligible for the income distribution deduction to the extent of available DNI, Treas. Reg. §
1.661(a)-2(e) (1988), unless they are deemed to pass directly to a beneficiary.
193. I.R.C. § 663(a)(1) (1982).
194. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
195. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).




Specific Sum of Money or Specific Property
To be disallowed as deductible distributions, transfers must be specifically
called for under the terms of the will or trust instrument. The high degree
of specificity required is inherent in distinguishing between the inheritance
of property and the inheritance of income from property that may be carried
out through in-kind property distributions. Only the latter type of transfer
is eligible for the income distribution deduction. Thus a trust or estate will
not be allowed the income distribution deduction if the amount of money
or the identity of the specific property is ascertainable under the terms of
the will as of the date of the decedent's death, or under the terms of the
trust instrument as of the date of the inception of the trust.
19 7
Transfers do not become deductible simply because the exact amount payable
cannot be ascertained with certainty under the terms of the will."9 8 It is not
material that the value of the bequest is determinable only at the time of
the decedent's death.'9 9 As long as the identity of the property is specified
in the governing instrument, pre-death events and conditions that affect the
value of the property do not make the transfer eligible for the deduction.
Thus, if under the terms of his will, the decedent bequeaths his interest in
a partnership to his son and a sum of money equal in value to the partnership
interest to his daughter, sufficient specificity is present and the distributions
are not deductible. As long as the identity of the property and the dollar
value of the bequest are not dependent on the post-death exercise of the
fiduciary's discretion, the transfers are specific and are not deductible. Pre-
death conditions affecting valuation, such as encumbrances on the partnership
properties, are not material."'0 Likewise, pecuniary bequests remain nondeduc-
tible even though the dollar amount is not stated in the will as long as they
are ascertainable as of the date of death.
20 1
197. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b)(1) (1988); Rev. Rul. 78-24, 1978-1 C.B. 196. To illustrate,
assume that under the terms of the will, a legacy of $5,000 was left to A, a designated number
of shares of X Co. stock was left to B, and the balance of the estate was divided between C
and D. During the year the estate had income of $20,000, and the executor paid the legacy
to A and transferred the designated shares of X Co. stock to B. If no other distributions were
made, the estate is not entitled to a distribution deduction. See example (1) in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.663(a)-1(b)(3) (1988).
198. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-I(b)(4) (1988).
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b)(1) (1988).
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-I(b)(1) (1988). However, post-death events become material. Thus
a bequest of so many shares of stock equal in value at the date of distribution to a designated
dollar amount is not specific and is thus deductible. The number of shares bequeathed was deter-
minable only at the date of distribution, not at the date of death, as is required for the disallowance.
Rev. Rul. 72-295, 1972-1 C.B. 197.
201. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(1) (1988). Thus a pecuniary bequest made pursuant to an
equalization clause in the will is not a deductible distribution. Rev. Rul. 82-4, 1982-1 C.B. 99
(To equalize the interests of two beneficiaries in the residue of the estate, the decedent's will
called for a transfer out of the residuary assets to one of the beneficiaries who did not receive
a lifetime transfer from the decedent in an amount equal to the value at the date of death of
the lifetime transfer. The transfer was not deductible because the amount of the bequest was
ascertainable as of the date of decedent's death.).
Moreover, giving the fiduciary the power in his discretion to select the mix of assets and cash
to distribute in satisfaction of a bequest of a specified dollar amount stated in the will does
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Similarly, conditions imposed on the transfer do not make the transfer
deductible, as long as the conditions affect only the timing of the transfer
and not the dollar amount or the identity of the property to be transferred.
For this purpose, the conditions imposed on the transfer must not be within
the control of the fiduciary.
202
A distribution of assets out of the residuary estate is, however, deductible
by the estate. Residuary bequests are not ascertainable as of the date of death
and lack the specificity required for the disallowance of the deduction because
the value and composition of the residuary estate are both dependent on post-
death events, such as the payment of administrative expenses.2 13 Consequently
distributions of the decedent's personal effects as part of the residuary estate,
such as the family car, are deductible by the estate, subject to available DNI,
even though they have the overtone of corpus distributions.
Other transfers deductible by the trust or estate as bequests of undetermined
dollar amounts or unidentified property include bequests of: (1) amounts paid
pursuant to formula clauses, such as marital deduction formula bequests;0 4
(2) amounts which can be paid only from current or accumulated income;s,
(3) amounts paid as an annuity or having the effect of an annuity; 2 6 and
(4) amounts required to be paid under the terms of the governing instrument
in more than three installments.2  These transfers are discussed below.
Installment Payments
To be disallowed as distributions deductible by trusts and estates, gifts or
bequests of a specific sum of money or of specific property must be paid
or credited all at once or in no more than three installments.2 0 8 By requiring
that the transfers not be paid in too many intervals, the provision attempts
to equate the transfers with distributions to beneficiaries who lack any in-
not convert the pecuniary bequest into a deductible distribution. The presence of the fiduciary's
discretion does not alter the fact that the monetary value of the bequest remains ascertainable
under the terms of the will as of the date of the decedent's death. Rev. Rul. 86-105, 1986-2
C.B. 82. Also, the fact that there may not be enough assets in the estate to satisfy the bequest
is not material. An abatement of the bequest does not transform the bequest into a deductible
bequest of the residue. Rev. Rul. 66-207, 1966-2 C.B. 243.
202. Thus, if under the terms of the trust instrument, $10,000 is to be distributed to A when
he reaches age twenty-five, and another $10,000 when he reaches age thirty-five, with payment
over to B of any amount not paid to A because of his death, the payments to A are not deduct-
ible. Alternatively, if A dies and the payments are made to B, such payments are likewise not
deductible. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(4) (1988).
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b)(2)(ii) (1988). Thus, if the executor in the example in note
197 distributed in accordance with an agreement with C and D part of the assets of the estate
to C and D having a value of $50,000, the distributions to C and D are deductible as distribu-
tions made out of the residuary estate. The distribution deduction is limited, however, to $20,000,
the amount of DNI for the year. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(3) (1988) (example (2)).
204. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(1) (1988).
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b)(2)(i) (1988).
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(2)(ii) (1988).
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b)(2)(iv) (1988).




terest in the trust's or estate's income. To the extent the transfers are in lump
sum, or lump sum equivalents, rather than periodic, they do not resemble
payments out of income, which are taxable to the beneficiaries and deductible
by the trust or estate.
20 9
In determining the number of installments, the number of payments called
for in the governing instrument controls. This means that the number of
transfers in fact made by the fiduciary are immaterial. Thus a lump sum pay-
ment by the fiduciary in satisfaction of a periodic bequest will not convert
an otherwise deductible bequest into a nondeductible distribution. The reverse
is equally true. A periodic payment of a lump sum specific bequest will not
alter the disallowance of the deductibility of such a transfer. 21 1
Whether a gift or bequest is required to be paid in more than three install-
ments is determined without regard to specific gifts or bequests of articles
for personal use. 21' Thus transfers of household furniture, a watch, an auto-
mobile, and other personal and household effects specifically provided for
in the governing instrument are nondeductible distributions regardless of the
number of transfers. 1 2 Moreover, such transfers do not affect the treatment
of other gifts or bequests. Thus, if a will provides for a bequest of a specific
sum of money to be paid out in three installments and additionally a specific
bequest of articles for personal use to be paid out in four installments, neither
transfer is a deductible distribution by the estate.2"3 Similarly disregarded for
purposes of the installment rule are transfers of property, title to which passes
directly to beneficiaries by operation of law or as a result of the form of
ownership.24
If a will provides only that the time of payment occur in the ordinary course
of administration of the estate, the transfers will be considered as made in
a single installment. 2 5 The regulations further provide that all gifts and be-
quests payable at any one specified time under the terms of the governing
instrument are considered paid in a single installment. Thus, the aggregate
number of payments and not the number of separate unrelated assets within
each payment is controlling for purposes of determining the number of in-
stallments. 6
209. Compare I.R.C. § 663(a)(1) (1988).
210. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(2)(iv) (1988); 1.663(a)-l(c)(2) (1988) (example (1), pt. (iii)).
211. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-I(c)(1)(i) (1988).
212. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(c)(2) (1988) (example (1), pt. (ii)).
213. rd.
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-I(c)(1)(ii) (1988).
215. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(c)(l)(iii) (1988). To illustrate, assume that under the terms of
the will, $10,000 in cash, a designated number of shares of X Co. stock, specifically identified
realty, and an interest in a partnership are bequeathed to A. The transfers are considered made
in a single installment, regardless of the manner of payment or distribution by the executor because
no time of payment was specified in the will. Had the will provided for four separate distribution
dates, the transfers would then be considered payable in more than three installments and would
become deductible distributions by the estate. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(c)(2) (1988) (example (1),
pt. (iii)).
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(c)(1)(iv) (1988). To illustrate, assume that under the terms of
the decedent's will a trust is created for the benefit of A pursuant to which a specified amount
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The not-more-than-three installments rule applies separately to estates and
their testamentary trusts.2"' Likewise, the installment rule applies separately
on a beneficiary-by-beneficiary basis. Thus, specific bequests of money payable
to four separate beneficiaries at four different times are not transfers payable
in more than three installments. The transfers remain nondeductible distribu-
tions of four separate single installments." 8 Finally, the installment rule applies
whether the installment payments occur all in one year or over a number of
years. 219
Interest or Income on Gifts or Bequests
Under applicable local law, an executor may be required to pay an amount
to a pecuniary legatee to compensate the legatee for any delay in paying the
legacy. 22 Similarly, under local law, the executor may be required to pay to
a legatee of specific property the income from that property earned from the
date of the decedent's death.22 ' Neither payment is a payment of a nondeduc-
tible specific gift or bequest. Such additional payments can be made only with
reference to the date of distribution and are thus not ascertainable as of the
date of the decedent's death, as required for specificity.
The tax treatment of such additional payments by the estate depends on
their characterization as interest payments on a pecuniary bequest or as income
payments on a specifically bequeathed property. In the former case, the pay-
ment is made to a creditor of the estate and as such is governed by the in-
terest paid rules.222 In the latter case, the additional payment is a distribution
to a beneficiary as such and is subject to the general distribution rules. This
also means, however, that if the income is retained by the estate, to be
distributed in a subsequent year along with the specific property that gave
rise to the income, such income is taxed to the estate. Furthermore, only so
of cash and a specified number of shares of stock are to be distributed to A at age twenty-five,
age thirty, and age thirty-five. The distributions are not deductible by the trust. Each cash and
stock distribution in the aggregate is treated as one installment payment by the testamentary
trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(c)(2), example (1), part (iii). Had the will called for an additional
trust distribution of cash only at age forty, all the distributions become deductible, not just
the cash distributions. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(c)(2) (1988) (example (2)).
217. Thus, in the example in the previous note, although the trust distributions become deduct-
ible in the second variation of the example, the nondeductible treatment to the estate in funding
the testamentary trust remains unchanged. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(c)(1) (1988).
218. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(c)(2) (1988) (example (3)).
219. I.R.C. § 663(a)(1) (1982) by its terms does not prohibit payments solely over three years,
but prohibits any payments in more than three installments regardless of the number of years
in which the installments are made. Compare the three-year requirement with respect to alimony
payments in I.R.C. § 71(f) (1982).
220. 6 PAGE ON WMLS § 59.11 (NV. Bowe & D. Parker rev. ed. 1962) and 3A A. ScoTT, THE
LAW OF TRusTS § 234.2 (W. Fratcher 4th ed. 1988).
221. A. ScoTT, supra note 220, at § 234.1.
222. I.R.C. § 163 (1982). See Rev. Rul. 73-322, 1973-2 C.B. 44 and United States v. Folckemer,
307 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1962), for interest characterization. For a contrary result, see Davidson




much of the subsequent distribution of the accumulated income is deductible
as is deemed to come out of the DNI for that subsequent year.
The above discussion assumes that the property subject to the bequest is
part of the estate and does not pass directly to the beneficiary. If the proper-
ty is to pass directly to the beneficiary, the estate would hold the property
as agent of the beneficiary and would not be subject to taxation on the in-
come earned from the property.
223
Marital Deduction Bequests
Bequests made pursuant to formula clauses in the governing instrument lack
the specificity needed for the inheritance exclusion. Thus, neither pecuniary
nor fractional share formula bequests are specific bequests that fall outside
the general distributions rules. Distributions made under either formula clause
are eligible for the income distribution deduction.
A formula pecuniary bequest in an amount equal to a fraction of the dece-
dent's adjusted gross estate is not a nondeductible specific bequest because
the determination of the value of the adjusted gross estate is dependent on
facts and events occurring after the date of death. The identity of the property
and the amount of the money to be distributed are dependent both on the
exercise of the executor's discretion, such as the election of the valuation date
and the election to deduct expenses against the income tax,22 ' and the payment
of death costs and administrative expenses. Thus neither the identity of the
property nor the dollar amount is ascertainable as of the date of decendent's
death as required for the disallowance of the distribution deduction.225
The same would be true of a pecuniary bequest of the entire adjusted gross
estate made to take advantage of the unlimited marital deduction. As long
as the bequest is made with reference to the decedent's adjusted gross estate,
the determination of the amount of the bequest is subject to facts not existing
at the date of death.226 Bequests pursuant to a fractional share or residuary
formula clause are likewise eligible for the income distribution deduction
because what assets are finally distributed is again dependent upon post-death
events and the exercise of the executor's discretion.227
The treatment of specific bequests coupled with formula bequests is
somewhat less clear. This situation would arise where a bequest of specific
property is applied to reduce the amount passing under the formula clause.
If form it not followed and the two formally separate bequests are collapsed,
the answer remains the same: both types of bequests are distributions deduc-
tibl6 to the extent of DNI.
223. The income earned would be taxed directly to the beneficiary as principal and owner
of the property. See supra note 16.
224. I.R.C. §§ 2032 and 642(g) (1982).
225. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-1(b)(1) and Rev. Rul. 60-87, 1960-1 C.B. 286. However, such bequests
are specific enough to trigger realization upon distribution under the Kenan principle discussed
earlier.
226. Id.
227. Id.; Letter Ruling 8145026 (Tech. Adv. Memo, July 31, 1981).
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Amounts Payable Only Out of Income
To remain nondeductible, a specific gift or bequest must not be payable
only from the income of the estate or trust. Thus an amount which can be
paid or credited under the terms of the governing instrument only from the
income of a trust or estate, whether from current or accumulated income,
is eligible for the income distribution deduction.228 Such payments resemble
deductible periodic installments more than nondeductible corpus distributions
that are deemed not to have any economic interest in the income of the trust
or estate.
Property Passing Directly to Beneficiaries
Property not part of the estate but inherited directly and without administra-
tion by the executor either by operation of law or as a result of the form
of joint ownership with the decedent is not subject to the distribution rules.
The property is inherited directly and not through the estate. Hence, the
beneficiary has no economic interest in the estate assets or income.
Accordingly, a deductible distribution does not include the value of any
interest in real estate owned by the decedent, title to which passes directly
under local law from the decedent to his heirs or devisees. 229 Although the
provision on its face is limited to realty, no doubt all property passing outside
the estate is similarly treated. Any income earned from the property inherited
directly is taxed outright to the heir entitled to the property. Such income
is not the estate's and a distribution deduction is not needed to allocate the
tax burden on such income.
This rule applies even if the property is subject to the claims of the decedent's
creditors, very much like probate assets subject to the distribution rules. 210
However, if the property and its income are used by the executor during the
administration of the estate, the income earned from the property is taxed
to the estate and if distributed is eligible for the income distribution deduction. 23'
Charitable Distributions
The income distribution deduction is not available for distributions which
otherwise are deductible as amounts paid, permanently set aside, or used for
charitable purposes; 3 2 otherwise such distributions would be deducted twice.
228. I.R.C. § 663(a)(1) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-l(b)(2)(i) (1988). To illustrate, assume
that a trust is to accumulate all income until beneficiary A reaches age twenty-one. At that time
$10,000 of the accumulated income is to be paid to beneficiary B and the balance to A, with
all current income to be paid to A until age twenty-five when the trust is to terminate and distribute
corpus to A. All the distributions are deductible to the extent of available DNI. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.663(a)-1(b)(3) (1988) (example (3)). A specific distribution out of income or corpus, however,
is nondeductible. Id.
229. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.661(a)-2(e) (1988) and 1.663(a)-l(c)(1)(ii). Petersen v. Commissioner,
35 T.C. 962 (1961); Rev. Rul. 71-167, 1971-1 C.B. 163.
230. Weber v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1940); Rev. Rul. 75-61, 1975-1 C.B. 180;
Rev. Rul. 68-49, 1968-1 C.B. 304.
231. Rev. Rul. 75-61, 1975-1 C.B. 180.




Moreover, the regulations further provide that the two deductions are mutually
exclusive. Charitable transfers are deductible by trusts and estates only as
charitable distributions under section 642(c). If the elements of that provision
are not met, no resort may be had to the income distribution deduction under
section 661(a).233 Case law, with one exception, has so far upheld the validity
of this interpretation in the regulations.1
3
1
Distributions Subject to Prior Deduction
No income distribution deduction is allowed for any amount actually
distributed in the current year if such amount was eligible for the distribution
deduction in a previous year. 235 This scenario could occur in two instances:
first, when amounts are deemed distributed in the previous year under the
65-day rule discussed above; and second, when amounts required to be
distributed currently and not actually distributed for reasons of administrative
convenience until after the close of the current year are deemed distributed
in the current year and not the subsequent year. 236 Thus a trust or estate will
not receive a double tax benefit for a single distribution simply because the
date of the crediting for tax purposes and the date of the actual distribution
are in separate years.
Distributions of Accumulated Income
Distributions of previously accumulated income should not be again taxed
when later distributed and hence should not be deducted when made by the
trust or estate, if the single tax concept of the taxation of such entities is
to be carried out. Distributions of previously accumulated income should be
treated as nondeductible corpus distributions. However, to the extent of the
current year's DNI, such distributions are deemed to be distributions of cur-
rent income and as such are deductible to that extent. Hence, distributions
of accumulated income are not deductible by the trust or estate only to the
extent they exceed available DNI for the year of the distribution, as discussed
earlier.
Distributions of IRD
Since the Tax Reform Act of 1984, distributions of property are now
governed by section 643(e). This section seems to include distributions of the
right to receive income in respect of the decedent (IRD) because the provision
applies to any interest in property distributed by a trust or estate. If this in-
terpretation is correct, then the fiduciary could, pursuant to that provision,
elect to treat the distribution as a taxable sale and accelerate the reporting
233. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-2 (1988).
234. Pullen v. United States, 610 F.2d 448 (D. Neb. 1979); Estate of A. Lindsay O'Connor
v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 165 (1977); Mott v. United States, 462 F.2d 512 (Ct. CI. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108; Rev. Rul. 83-75, 1983-1 C.B. 114. Contra United States Tr. Co. v. United
States, 617 F. Supp. 575 (S.D. Miss. 1985), rev'd 803 F.2d 1363.
235. I.R.C. § 663(a)(3) (1982).
236. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(a)-3 (1988).
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of the IRD item.2" The income distribution deduction will then equal the
amount of the IRD item, which amount would also be included in the income
of the beneficiary receiving the distribution."' If the fiduciary does not so
elect, the income distribution deduction would be limited to the basis of the
IRD item in the trust or estate,239 usually zero. 240 The income on the IRD
item would be reported by the beneficiary when actually collected in a subse-
quent year.2 " The flexibility in the election thus is the timing with respect
to reporting the income on the IRD item by the beneficiary. In neither case,
however, will the trust or estate be taxed on the IRD. If the election is made
and the reporting in income of the IRD is accelerated, the resultant income
is canceled by an income distribution deduction of equal amount. If the elec-
tion is not made, no deduction (but also no income) is reported by the trust
or estate with regard to the IRD item. The absence of the deduction does
not disadvantage the trust or estate because the distribution of the IRD item
does not accelerate the reporting of its income.
To date, however, a number of cases have held that distributions of IRD
items fall outside the general distribution rules applicable to the taxation of
trusts and estates. 4 2 The effect of this case law is to deny the election under
section 643(e) with regard to IRD items and thus remove the flexibility with
regard to the timing of IRD income in the hands of the beneficiary. In either
event, however, the treatment of the trust or estate remains the same. It will
not be subject to tax on the IRD income, and the income distribution deduc-
tion is correspondingly applied to reflect that fact. The cases on point, however,
all predate the enactment of section 643(e). Their continued vitality thus could
be doubtful. Nevertheless, it is still valid to point out that the scheme of IRD
taxation is antagonistic to the income distribution deduction with respect to
timing and the character of the income reported.2 3
Conclusion
The income distribution deduction allowed to trusts and estates distinguishes
these legal entities from all other taxable units. The deduction allows trusts
and estates to avoid taxation on their income by shifting such taxation to
their beneficiaries at the direction of the governing instrument or at the discre-
tion of the fiduciary. The deduction thus provides for private ordering of
the tax consequences of income realized by trusts and estates and puts a
premium on sophisticated planning and on the sophisticated executor or trustee.
237. I.R.C. §§ 643(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986) and 691(a)(2) (1982). Note, however, that § 643(e)(3)
speaks of recognizing gain, not income.
238. I.R.C. § 643(e)(3)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986).
239. I.R.C. § 643(e)(2)(A), (e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
240. IRD is acquired with a carryover basis. I.R.C. § 1014(c) (1982).
241. I.R.C. § 691(a)(1) and (2) (1982).
242. Edward D. Rollert Residuary Tr. v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1985); aff'g
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The changes brought about by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have encouraged
the distribution of income by trusts and estates. By contrast, prior to that
Act, a common tax-planning device was to minimize overall taxes by ac-
cumulating income at the trust or estate level. A stated purpose of the 1986
Act was to reduce the tax-saving benefits from such a use of trusts and estates.
The Act achieved this purpose by substantially increasing the tax rates ap-
plicable to trusts and estates in comparison to those applicable to individuals.
The higher marginal tax rates of trusts and estates now discourage accumula-
tions and provide an incentive to distribute income to beneficiaries. This turn
of events has revived interest in the income distribution deduction. This article
attempts to provide a road map drawn exclusively from the perspective of
the use and availability of the income distribution deduction.
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